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Techniques exist for assessment, modeling, and simulation of physical and cy-
ber infrastructures, respectively; but such isolated analysis is incapable of fully captur-
ing the interdependencies that occur when they intertwine to create a cyber-physical
system (CPS). The first contribution of this doctoral research includes qualitative
representation of the operation of a CPS in a single multi-agent model. Dependable
operation of a CPS is contingent upon correct interpretation of data describing the
state of the system. To this end, we propose agent-based semantic interpretation
services that extract useful information from raw sensor data. We utilize the sum-
mary schemas model to reconcile differences in data resolution, syntax, and semantics;
and to facilitate imprecise query of databases that maintain historical information,
including failure mitigation techniques.
Another contribution of the research is in developing ontologies that enable
automated reasoning in the classification and mitigation of failures in CPS operation.
As a measure of dependability, we quantify the effectiveness of our proposed ontology-
based approach in identifying correct mitigation techniques. Our methodology and
models are applicable to a broad range of CPSs; however, they are described in the
context of intelligent water distribution networks (WDNs), which are cyber-physical
critical infrastructure systems responsible for reliable delivery of potable water. We
illustrate the use of game theory in agent-based decision support for allocation of wa-
ter. As a precursor to empirical validation with field data, we developed an integrated
cyber-physical WDN simulator using EPANET and MATLAB, and illustrate the use
of this simulator in validating our agent-based model and ontology-based approach
to automated mitigation of failure.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are the integration of computation, as man-
ifested by embedded computers and communication networks, with physical pro-
cesses [1], [2]. In CPSs, sensors collect information about the physical operation of
the system, and communicate this information in real time to the computers and
embedded systems used for intelligent control. These cyber components use com-
putational intelligence to process the information and determine appropriate control
settings for physical components of the system, such as devices used to control the
flow of a physical commodity, e.g., water or electric power, on a line.
A fundamental challenge in research related to CPSs is modeling of these
systems. Accurate representation of a CPS encompasses three aspects: computing,
communication, and the physical infrastructure. Fundamental differences exist be-
tween the attributes of cyber and physical components, significantly complicating
representation of their behavior with a single comprehensive model (or simulation
tool) [3]. Specialized models and simulation tools exist for the engineering domains
represented in critical infrastructure; including power, water, and transportation [4].
These models and tools have been created with the objective of accurately reflecting
the operation of the physical system, at high spatial and temporal resolution. Intel-
ligent control is not captured, leaving these models incapable of representing CPSs.
Ideally, a single model would encompass both the physical and cyber system
semantics of a CPS in a meaningful way, such that the effects of a specific event
are reflected in the reaction of either a cyber or a physical component of the sys-
tem. Interdependencies among the cyber and physical components, in operation and
failure, present a major challenge, as they invalidate simplified models that assume
2components fail independently [5]. This hampers study of the reliability of CPSs -
an urgent task, given the increasing use of cyber control in critical infrastructures.
The research presented in this dissertation rises to the challenge of develop-
ing models and simulation techniques that capture cyber-physical interdependencies,
while accurately reflecting the operation and attributes of the cyber and physical in-
frastructures. More specifically, the goal is to develop techniques for qualitative and
quantitative characterization of the effect of introducing “intelligence” to physical
infrastructure systems, in terms of reliability.
Agent-based modeling is the foundation of this doctoral research, which began
with qualitative representation of the operation of a CPS, as a precursor to quanti-
tative modeling. An agent is defined as an independent entity capable of making
decisions based on information from its environment [6]. Agents can bridge the gap
between the cyber and physical layers of a CPS, by serving as stewards for information
representing attributes of both layers. An agent-based model can represent diverse
characteristics and behaviors at high resolution, a feature essential to capturing the
intricacies of a CPS [7].
In this dissertation, a CPS has been modeled as a multi-agent system, where
each agent is an independent entity that manages resources within its local scope.
The CPS used as a case study is an intelligent water distribution network (WDN),
where physical components; e.g., valves, pipes, and reservoirs, are coupled with the
hardware and software that support intelligent water allocation. Figure 1.1 depicts a
sample WDN.
In brief, the goal of this doctoral research is to model, analyze, and mitigate
failures in CPSs, with water distribution selected as the application domain. Based
on investigation of studies on hydraulics, as well as knowledge of potential comput-
ing failures, we have identified and categorized potential failures and corresponding
mitigation techniques for a WDN, as depicted in Figs. 1.2 and 1.3, respectively.
3Figure 1.1: Cyber and physical components of a WDN.
This dissertation describes the following original research contributions (listed
in chronological order), which have been published in seven refereed conference pub-
lications, two book chapters, and two journal papers.
1. Development of an integrated CPS simulator for WDNs, using EPANET [8]
and MATLAB to represent the physical infrastructure and the decision support
algorithms used to control the allocation of water, respectively [9].
2. Development of a qualitative multi-agent model for WDNs, which represents
both physical and cyber infrastructures of the CPS [10].
3. Refinement of the multi-agent WDN model to represent semantic interpretation
of raw data [11,12].
4Figure 1.2: Failure modes of a WDN.
4. Development of a Markov chain model for WDNs, and use of this model in
quantitative analysis of non-functional system properties; e.g., reliability, mean
time to failure [13].
5. Enhancement of the qualitative model to address semantic heterogeneity and
facilitate imprecise query of data sources [14].
5Figure 1.3: Failure mitigation techniques for a WDN.
6. Investigation and simulation of game theory as an algorithmic tool for decision
support in WDNs [15], [16].
7. Definition of an ontology to facilitate automated decision support for WDNs
[17], [18].
8. Investigation of the efficacy of failure mitigation using the defined ontology [19].
6The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a
review of related literature. Section 3 describes our approach to agent-based model-
ing of WDNs and presents quantitative analysis and simulation techniques for these
systems. Ontologies that reflect various aspects of the semantic relationships among
components in a WDN are presented in Section 4, where we also present the use of
these ontologies in automated failure mitigation. As an illustration of the utility of
our proposed technique, Section 5 describes and validates an agent-based environ-
mental decision support system that employs game theory to guide water allocation.
We conclude with Section 6, which proposes avenues for future extensions to this
research.
72 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A significant problem in the study of dependability in CPSs in general, and
critical infrastructure systems in particular, is characterizing the interdependencies
between their cyber and physical components. System complexity has been cited as
the main challenge [20]. Other challenges include the low probability of occurrence
of critical events, differences in time scales associated with various events, and the
difficulty of gathering the data needed for accurate modeling.
A number of modeling and simulation techniques for critical infrastructure
are enumerated in [4]. Among these techniques, agent-based models are of partic-
ular interest to this doctoral research, as they are capable of capturing component
interactions in an accurate, yet simple, fashion. The need for agent-based modeling
of distributed complex systems has been investigated in [7]. The availability and
reliability of agent-based systems - both significant concerns - are discussed in [21].
The Unified Modeling Language (UML), as a formal specification language with pre-
cise semantics, has been adopted to model agent-based systems, as demonstrated in
detail in [22]. In this doctoral research, we have utilized UML 2.0 to construct an
agent-based model that qualitatively captures static and dynamic aspects of a CPS.
Existing modeling techniques for CPSs rely upon semantics to represent the
relationship between the cyber and physical components of a CPS. The majority of
existing models for CPSs are qualitative in nature. One of very few existing quantita-
tive models is presented in [23], where the Markov imbedded systems technique is used
to model reliability of a smart (power) grid, based on knowledge of cascading failures
in the system. The existence of data about these cascading failures allows the study
to begin from a more advanced stage than was possible for the research described in
8this dissertation. However, our work shares the goal of characterizing and predict-
ing the operation and failure of a CPS, based on understanding the domain-specific
semantics of the system.
The reliability of WDNs, from a purely physical point of view, has long been a
topic of interest to the civil engineering community, and is critical to semantic under-
standing of the physical side of the CPS in focus for this dissertation. Salient studies
include work on inoperability modeling [24], which we have used as a basis for analyz-
ing the reliability of the physical infrastructure. Our research encompasses both cyber
and physical aspects of WDNs, and supplements the probabilistic models developed for
the physical layer with quantitative data gathered by the cyber components.
From the engineering implementation perspective, semantic agent technologies
are typically closely associated with sensor networks, and several prototype systems
and software architectures have been proposed based on the combination of the two.
A prototype for battlefield information systems has been described in [25], where the
stated goal is to dynamically integrate sensor networks with information fusion pro-
cesses to support real-time sensing, interpretation, and decision-making in a tactical
environment. In [26], an architecture and programming model has been presented
for a semantic service-oriented sensor information platform. In contrast to [26], our
work expands the semantic service model to a semantic agent framework, whereas [26]
focuses on how to use the semantic model to query the system for high-level events
without processing raw sensed signals. The use of autonomous semantic agents in
developing a new software architecture for distributed processing environments has
been proposed in [27]. The discussion in [27] involves software architecture in general,
and utilizes semantic web technologies; whereas our work is tailored to the specific
requirements of CPSs.
The complexity of CPSs, as well as the necessity of capturing embedded com-
puting and communication capabilities motivate the use of distributed agents and
9semantic services for representing the relationship between the cyber and physical
infrastructures. In our work, the distributed semantic agent model represents the
augmentation of data acquisition by sensors in the CPS with decision-making intel-
ligence. To our knowledge, our work is the first application of semantic agents to
modeling of CPSs.
Several challenges to the development of a generic framework for the design,
modeling, and simulation of CPSs are articulated in [28]. Features described as
desirable for such a framework include the integration of existing simulation tools,
reusability of software, and graphical representation of the modeling and simulation
environment. Our proposed integrated simulator meets these criteria.
The study most closely related to our proposed simulation method is [29],
where a method is proposed for integration of the ns-2 network simulator with the
Modelica framework, a modeling language for large-scale physical systems. The study
highlights the challenge of two-way synchronization of the simulators. The key dif-
ference between this study and our work is that we link to a specialized simulator
capable of accurately representing the operation of the physical infrastructure - in this
case a WDN, at high resolution.
In a WDN, heterogeneous sensor networks and related databases create a mul-
tidatabase platform that provides data to the semantic services, which in turn provide
information to decision support algorithms. One of the goals of multidatabase plat-
forms is to provide transparent and uniform access to heterogeneous data sources [30].
The summary schemas model (SSM) has been designed to fulfill this objective at low
cost [30, 31, 32], while preserving local autonomy and offering scalability. SSM en-
ables automatic identification of semantically similar/dissimilar data that have differ-
ent/same names and representations. This identification is carried out very efficiently,
to the point where in some instances, in spite of their higher complexity, imprecise
queries can be carried out faster than precise queries [31]. Among the many benefits
10
of SSM, its support for imprecise queries is of greatest relevance to our work, as it
relaxes constraints on the form and vocabulary of database queries.
Experts differ on their definitions of “ontology,” but every definition we have
encountered concurs that an ontology is a representation of entities and the relation-
ships among them [33]. A definition given in [34] characterizes an ontology as the
specification of conceptualizations that are used to help computers and humans share
knowledge. The semantic web and social network research communities have been
especially prolific in their use of ontologies [35], [36]. Two well-known examples are
Friend of a Friend (FOAF) [37] and Flink [38], which have been used to analyze social
networks, discover communities of practice [39], and explore “hot” topics [40]. Recent
applications of ontologies in automated reasoning include their use in improving situ-
ational awareness [41]. We adopt ontologies to reflect various aspects of the semantic
relationships among components in the WDN and apply automated reasoning on these
ontologies to classify and mitigate failures.
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3 MODELING, ANALYSIS, AND SIMULATION OF WDNS
This section lays the groundwork for the remainder of the dissertation by
presenting qualitative modeling and quantitative analysis of WDNs. We propose a
multi-agent qualitative model, based on knowledge of the composition and functional-
ity of a WDN. This model was validated using behavior-based simulation, and served
as a basis for subsequent quantitative analysis of WDN reliability. The extension of
the initial qualitative model includes semantic interpretation of sensor data in the
WDN, and the use of SSM to reconcile semantic heterogeneity and facilitate impre-
cise query of data sources. We also developed an integrated WDN simulator capable
of reflecting both cyber and physical aspects and utilized this simulator in validation
of our models and methods. In the interest of readability, an overview of the qualita-
tive and quantitative models and a simple simulation are presented here; details are
deferred to Appendices A through C.
The qualitative analysis was published in the Proceedings of the 5th IEEE
Workshop on Engineering Semantic Agent Systems (ESAS) [11]; and as a book chap-
ter [12]. An expanded version of the quantitative analysis will appear in the Inter-
national Journal of Performability Engineering [13]. The integrated cyber-physical
simulator was published in the Proceedings of the 8th IEEE International Conference
on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing (DASC ’09) [9]. The application of
SSM was published in the Proceedings of the 20th IEEE International Heterogeneity
in Computing Workshop (HCW) [14].
3.1 QUALITATIVE MODELING OF A WDN
For any system, qualitative modeling is a necessary precursor to quantitative
analysis. In this subsection, we present a qualitative model for a typical WDN, with
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the goal of capturing the interaction between the cyber and physical infrastructures.
We use UML to represent this model, due to the precise semantics offered by this
formal specification language.
Our work aims to accurately model a CPS as a multi-agent system, where each
agent is an independent entity that manages resources within its local scope. The
fundamental feature of an agent is its capability of making independent decisions,
which defines agents as active, rather than purely passive entities [42]. Typically, an
agent has the attributes of discreteness, autonomy, speed, repeatability, intelligence,
flexibility, and situation-awareness [42, 43]. An agent is capable of perceiving its en-
vironment, acting on that perception, and interacting with other agents. Agents are
diverse, heterogenous, and dynamic in their behavioral rules and attributes. Behav-
ioral rules for agents vary in granularity, sophistication, information load for decision
making, and the extent of memory of past events retained by the agent for its future
decision making. As a result, the agent-based paradigm is very well-suited to rep-
resentation of complex heterogenous systems. In a WDN, the agent-based approach
offers a dependable, distributed method for managing water resource allocation, en-
forcing system rules, and responding to unexpected events.
Creating a use case diagram is the first step for qualitative system analysis.
A use case captures the interaction of a number of external actors with the system
towards accomplishment of a goal, which in our case is the provision of potable
water. Figure 3.1 shows an actor and use cases involved in a WDN, where each use
case represents one functionality in the model. The blue circles highlight the sources
of heterogeneity in the WDN, which are of particular relevance to the discussion of
Section 3.4, where we elaborate on the use of SSM for reconciling this heterogeneity.
This use case diagram can be readily generalized to other CPSs whose main goal
is management of a physical commodity. Examples include smart power grids and
intelligent transportation systems.
13
Figure 3.1: Use case diagram for a WDN.
The CPS agent is the actor in the use case diagram, and associated with the
decision support algorithm. The agent accesses the system on behalf of an entity
and queries the various data sources available, e.g., sensor networks and databases
with historical records. For simplicity, only use cases associated with one agent are
shown in Fig. 3.1; all other agents have similar use cases associated with them.
As shown in Fig. 3.1, sensors collect information about the physical operation of
the system on a time- or event-triggered basis. As sensors collect data from different
areas, the events may occur sporadically, and the data may be represented in different
formats, significant heterogeneity is likely to exist in the data. Heterogeneous data
with differences in format and scale is collected by sensors and sent for Data Integrity
Check, which is a stage of intelligent semantic inference.
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The Data Integrity Check use case utilizes three main data streams to identify
corrupt or invalid sensor data; specifically, i) real-time data from nearby sensors for the
same or related physical attributes, ii) information about the physical infrastructure,
and iii) data from a (multi)database that maintains historical sensor data. The second
and third data streams mentioned are used for corroboration of the first data stream,
by checking for discrepancies in the values, whether in variation or in conformance
to physical (hydraulic) laws that govern the operation of the physical infrastructure
of the WDN. If no data is available from nearby sensors, as would be the case if all
nearby sensors are in sleep mode, the history multidatabase will serve as the only
source of data for corroboration.
The semantic interpretation service is incorporated in the Data Integrity Check
use case to organize the information into a meaningful hierarchy. The SSM provides
the ability to perform imprecise queries on the aforementioned data sources, by facili-
tating the identification of semantically similar/dissimilar data. In concert, use of the
semantic interpretation service and the SSM while checking data integrity provides
transparent and uniform access to heterogeneous data sources. The SSM maintains a
hierarchical (logical) meta-data structure based on access terms imported from various
local databases, and can be implemented using existing multidatabase technologies,
without requiring update or reconfiguration of the local databases. This feature is
critical in WDNs, where modifying legacy databases is often infeasible. In this fash-
ion, local autonomy is preserved, while supporting scalability. This approach is very
well-suited to large WDNs, which are composed of multiple autonomous districts,
each of which can potentially have a different local configuration.
After the integrity of the sensor data is confirmed, it is passed on to the
Decision Support Algorithm, which utilizes data from two additional sources, each of
which can exhibit significant heterogeneity. One of these data sources is the history
multidatabase, which maintains information about past results of decision support,
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e.g., valve settings. Information transmitted from other agents serves as a second
data source. For most cases, the other agents are the neighboring agents whose
geographical locations are close to the local agent. The Decision Support Algorithm
is typically implemented in distributed fashion, and its goal is to facilitate intelligent
management of physical commodities - in this case, water. The algorithm can make
use of legitimate (corroborated) data whose integrity has been checked, and can also
resort to the history multidatabase for adjustment (rectification) of the calculated
values in determining an appropriate strategy for resource allocation. Meanwhile, the
local agent interacts and negotiates with other agents by sharing real-time information
that provides a global perspective of resources in the system, and adjusts its own
strategy accordingly.
Construction of a state diagram is the next step in qualitative analysis of the
WDN, as it describes dynamic operation of the system. For simplicity, at this stage,
we consider only the quantity water and do not represent actions related to controlling
its quality (chemical composition). Figure 3.2 depicts the state transition diagram of
a WDN during one data processing period, which begins when the data is collected
and ends when intelligent control has been exerted on the water flow. The condition
that can trigger entry to or exit from a particular state has been specified on the
corresponding arc.
In Fig. 3.1, we have highlighted the states where significant heterogeneity is
likely to be encountered. The Data Integrity Check is the most critical state for pro-
cessing data from heterogeneous sources, and for using the capabilities of the SSM to
achieve interoperability. When applying the SSM atop the semantic interpretation,
the heterogeneous data sources are reconciled by extracting the essence of the data
semantics and aggregating similar data into a more compact semantic entity for fur-
ther processing. The resulting interoperability among autonomous areas in the WDN
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Figure 3.2: State transition diagram for a WDN.
presents the decision support algorithm with transparent and unified access to more
compact information.
In Fig. 3.2, the encircled “H” denotes the point where the agent process is
making a decision based on a combination of historical and current data (collected by
the sensors and checked for integrity). The collection of sensor data is disabled while
multidatabase data is being retrieved; afterward, both the newly-collected sensor data
and the retrieved multidatabase data are used by the agent in an effort to improve the
efficacy of the decision made. Countermeasures have been abstracted as transition
states for evaluation of the reliability of the system after remedial actions.
Repast was used for validation of the qualitative WDN model, due to its
ability to factor agents, relationships, and behaviors into separate components [44].
In Fig.3.3, Fig.3.3(a) depicts how the qualitative model is translated into component
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behavior definitions by Repast. Figure 3.3(b) depicts a very simple WDN, where six
nodes are connected in a linear topology. The size of each node reflects the quantity
of water at the node - initially set to 100 gallons per minute (gpm). An agent is
associated with each node. The associated behavior is “Watch for quantity change”,
which represents the negotiation underlying a change in a node’s water quantity,
which can occur in reaction to changes in the water quantity of other nodes.
(a) Flow chart of the water node agent. (b) Node deployment.
Figure 3.3: System behavior and topology assumed for Repast validation.
As a simple example, we increased the quantity of the first node to 300 gpm,
representing an injection of water into this node. This change should incrementally
propagate to other nodes. Figure 3.4 depicts the WDN after the increase in water
has propagated to three downstream nodes, as reflected by the increased size of the
nodes. Figure 3.5 illustrates the gradual propagation of this change to all six nodes
of the WDN.
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Figure 3.4: Node deployment during simulation.
Figure 3.5: Reaction to increase in water quantity of Node 1.
To reflect the intelligent decision-making process of the agent, we add two
decision blocks to the flow chart of 3.3(a). The first decision block evaluates whether
the current quantity is within the safe range (50-400 gpm in this example). If the
quantity is outside the safe range, then the decision flow goes to the second decision
block, which prevents this unsafe change from propagating to other nodes. If the
quantity is too low, the agent will limit the change propagated, i.e., will raise the
19
quantity of water at other nodes (for example to the default value of 100 gpm) to
mitigate the damage caused by the unsafe decrease. This can be accomplished by
injecting water from a conduit to the node immediately downstream. This remedial
action is shown in Fig. 3.6. Similar remedial action can be taken for a quantity that
is dangerously high, as shown in Fig. 3.7.
Figure 3.6: Isolating the unsafe decrease in water quantity of Node 1.
Figure 3.7: Isolating the unsafe increase in water quantity of Node 1.
3.2 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF A WDN
The qualitative model described in Section 3.1 served as the basis for quanti-
tative reliability analysis. We used the Symbolic Hierarchical Automated Reliability
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and Performance Evaluator (SHARPE) [45] to develop and simulate a Markov chain
model for the WDN. The time-dependent functions describing each component’s be-
havior are restricted by SHARPE to be exponential-polynomial in form.
Figure 3.2 serves as the basis for the Markov chain model shown in Fig. 3.8,
where each state is labeled with the functionality of the system in that state, and each
transition arc is labeled with the corresponding transition probability. In the absence
of field data, these values were estimated based on semantics of the operation of the
WDN, as deduced from hydraulics literature. Population of the model with field data
is a future task. In Fig. 3.8, the rectangles highlight the states that represent failure
of certain components, and the circle highlights the “decision making” state, which is
the state of greatest interest from the CPS perspective. The transition probabilities
leaving each state should sum to one; however, SHARPE does not represent self-
transitions, hence, the probabilities associated with self-transitions do not appear in
the figure.
We applied the severity specification in FMEA [46], to categorize the five types
of failures marked by the rectangles in Fig. 3.8 into three groups:
1. The most critical failure is the “decision fail”, as the failure of this component
can lead to malfunction of the overall system.
2. The second-level failures are the “pipe bursts” and/or the “actuator fail”, as
both pipes and actuators have repair mechanisms and hence can recover from
the failure states.
3. The third-level failures are the “sensor fail” and/or the “check fail”. The data
integrity check is likely to identify faulty sensor data. At this point, we are
assuming that the checking mechanism is relatively reliable, as compared to
other components of the system. This assumption can be relaxed in the future.
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Figure 3.8: Markov chain model for an intelligent WDN.
The UML state transition diagram for a purely physical WDN is shown as
Fig. 3.9. Similar to its CPS counterpart - the intelligent WDN, a local node can
exchange water with its neighboring nodes, and the neighboring nodes can in turn
interact with each other. However, in a purely physical WDN, the water exchange is
not controlled by agents, and therefore no intelligent decision support or automated
failure mitigation exists.
The Markov chain model for a purely physical WDN is depicted in Fig. 3.10.
The “sensor detection” state (on the far left) represents the collection of data when
a “new water quantity” occurs. In this state, information is reported for accounting
purposes, not for decision support. The “actuator control” state (circled) is the only
state in the system where some measure of intelligence is present in managing the
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Figure 3.9: State transition diagram for a purely physical WDN.
water on the physical network. However, the actuator control is itself vulnerable to
failure, the occurrence of which may lead to the “pipe bursts” state. This state is
considered an absorbing state, as the physical system is assumed to fail if a pipe
bursts in the network. This is based on the assumption that the lack of real-time
communication prevents timely alert of this failure and considerably delays repair.
Similar to the Markov model for the CPS, the transition probabilities have been
assigned based on understanding of the semantics of the system. An extension planned
to this work is derivation of these probabilities from field data.
The analysis editor provided by SHARPE can be used to compare various
reliability attributes, e.g., mean time to system failure (MTTSF ), of the physical and
intelligent (cyber-physical) WDNs. For the CPS, the MTTSF ranges from 86.93 to
175.08 sec, while for the purely physical WDN, it ranges from 3.94 to 4.07 sec. As
expected, the cyber infrastructure delays system failure. The expected reward (Exrt)
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Figure 3.10: Markov chain model for a purely physical WDN.
is a parameter that can reflect the relative intelligence level of the two systems. For
the CPS, the Exrt at t = 100 sec is 8.66, as compared to 5.22 for the purely physical
WDN.
3.3 A SEMANTIC AGENT FRAMEWORK FOR MODELING WDNs
The multi-agent model described in Section 3.1 was extended to incorporate
semantic agents, which represent dynamic integration of information from the sensor
networks with semantic services to facilitate real-time decision support in the WDN.
The resulting semantic agent framework is described below.
3.3.1 Sensor Information Ontology. Semantic interpretation is carried
out on semantic streams of verified data, each of which is defined in a domain-specific
ontology associated with the agent. Generally, an ontology is a description, e.g.,
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a formal specification of the relationships among a number of entities. The notion
of ontology utilized in this dissertation is a model that describes semantic relations
among components of the physical and cyber infrastructures, respectively, as well as
interdependencies across the cyber-physical boundary.
Each component in the ontology model is a unique class in terms of imple-
mentation, with properties and parameters described in the class definition. The
relations define how classes can be related to one another. Semantic interpretation
is implemented through distributed software with capabilities of extraction, analysis,
and processing of the semantic stream. The definition of an ontology for the WDN
domain facilitates the extraction of useful information from the heterogenous data,
unifies information presentation, and permits software and information reuse, so as
to reduce information redundancy during the process of semantic interpretation by
the agents.
Figure 3.11 shows the information hierarchy for failure detection through the
semantic interpretation process, given the verified sensor data. In this figure, which is
a UML class diagram, each block (class) represents one type of semantic stream in the
WDN; i.e., the ontology captures the semantic relationships among the heterogeneous
data streams.
Figure 3.11 shows how a failure in the WDN can be detected by the agent
in the event of physical or cyber failure, the latter of which occurs when data falls
outside a pre-defined safety range. Failures in the physical infrastructure of a WDN
are of two main types: physical failure due to excessive values of pressure and ele-
vation, or biochemical failure due to excessive quantities of a biochemical substance
or discovery of unknown biochemical materials. Failures in the cyber infrastructure
can be attributed to either human error (accidental or malicious), or malfunction of
computing devices. The ultimate determination of failure is carried out by the agent,
which has authority over all sensors deployed within its administrative scope.
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Figure 3.11: Failure detection ontology for a WDN.
The sensor information ontology captures the semantics of entities (classes in
the UML diagram) and the relations of events and objects, resulting in intelligent
reasoning capability beyond what sensors can provide through detection alone. The
ontology proposed in Fig. 3.11 is specific to the WDN domain, but can be readily
adapted to other CPSs.
3.3.2 Model for Semantic Services. Based on the sensor information
ontology proposed, we can develop components for implementing conversion of se-
mantics between classes in the information processing hierarchy. This conversion is
carried out by extracting new semantic information from existing data streams. In
other words, the components encapsulate the semantic service into a “black-box”
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containing the execution method, which takes as input information corresponding
to events detected by sensors and generates as output a number of meaningful new
events.
A semantic service model is proposed to overlay the ontology defined in Fig. 3.11.
The semantic services can be categorized into two types: i) supplementation services,
which supplement input events with additional semantic annotation; and ii) trans-
formation services, which produce new semantic streams. Supplementation services
can only identify additional properties carried by the input event. For example, a
sensor has detected that the water pressure in a certain area has exceeded the safety
threshold and reports this event to its semantic service component, which can be a
sensor or multiplexer at a higher level of the information hierarchy. The semantic
service model associated with this component will add the geographical location as
an additional identifier to distinguish this event from events reported from other ar-
eas. Such functionality is particularly useful for distributed control and management
in the context of CPSs, where a service may not correspond to a centralized compo-
nent that physically exists on one device; it can be physically implemented on several
distributed devices, but logically exist as a single service.
In contrast, a transformation service automatically terminates the input se-
mantic stream, and generates an output semantic stream for propagation on the
ontology. The essence of this type of service is semantic transformation, where the
input and output events are different classes in the ontology. One typical semantic
transformation is generalization. For example, in Fig. 3.11, an excessive pressure
quantity will be interpreted as physical failure due to an abnormal pressure value.
Later on, the semantic stream of physical failure will be propagated to a higher level
for ultimate decision making, instead of the semantic stream of abnormal pressure
quantity, which no longer exists. Transformation services can greatly reduce the
complexity of the data stream, by extracting only unique and necessary information.
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Therefore, transformation is the main semantic service that reconciles heterogeneity,
by transparently unifying semantically similar streams.
The benefits of this semantic service model and information ontology include
the reduction of information redundancy, pre-processing and abstraction of data for
the agent, and the facilitation of semantic queries. A cyber component can issue a
query that requests that a certain data stream with desired semantics be provided to
a given component device to diagnose whether failure exists at the queried level. The
SSM further enhances this ability, processing the query based on semantic similarity
to other queries, thereby enabling support of imprecise queries. Greater detail on this
feature is presented in Section 3.4.
3.3.3 Semantic Agent Framework. Figure 3.12 illustrates how the
agents use the information collected by sensors and the interpreted semantics based
on the defined ontology. Raw data is obtained from sensor networks, and since each
agent is an independent entity in charge of a particular geographical region, sensors
located in distributed areas are managed by different agents (with possible overlap).
For a semantic service component, the input semantic events are preconditions of the
service. The postconditions, i.e., the processed output semantics are provided to the
agents for further computing.
To implement the service in C++, the properties of the service are parameter-
ized, and the execution method of the service becomes the corresponding method of
the service class. For example, consider the Pressure to Failure branch of Fig. 3.11.
Sensors are treated as services with only output semantics, which are parameterized
into data that can be used by superior service components (those at a higher level of
the information hierarchy). Each component has been specified with a service name
and associated parameters. Each service takes the output of an inferior component
as the input to its execution method, and inherits the parameters to ensure that at-
tributes of a potential failure source (such as pressure, failure time, or location) are
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Figure 3.12: Semantic agent framework.
not lost during information propagation on the ontology. Pseudocode for our C++
implementation is shown in Fig. 3.13.
3.4 RECONCILING DATABASE HETEROGENEITY
In developing a multi-agent model for a CPS, our focus in this subsection is on
reconciling heterogeneity among the data sources underpinning the intelligent decision
support. We utilize SSM to establish semantic interoperability among heterogeneous
data sources, while maintaining high performance and local autonomy.
3.4.1 Model Structure. The SSM is an advanced semantic processing
model that supports our semantic services by extracting the semantics of access terms
from underlying local databases and forming a hierarchical information structure.
The SSM increases the efficiency of information retrieval from distributed sources by
merging similar semantics. The imprecision allowed in queries as a result of using
SSM extends beyond the syntax and linguistics, to the location of data, which is a




/* properties of sensors: water detection, geographical ID, location*/
Outputs(pressure, elevation, biochemical, location);





/*service indicates execution method and the parameter is pressure*/
Inputs (sensor(water_sensor, geoID, [width,length,height]));
If (pressure > normal range)
Outputs (pressure_normal (false), detected (pressure,geoID,T));






If ((elevation < normal range) && (pressure_normal = false))


















Case (within range for safe): service terminates;
Case (within range for critical): send (pressure,geoID,T) to database;
Case (within range for safe): output system failure alert;
Default: service terminates;
}
Outputs(system_failure_alert, detected( water_failure,physical _failure,pressure,geoID,T));
}
Figure 3.13: Pseudocode for semantic service.
By maintaining a hierarchical meta-data structure based on the information
retrieved from the underlying local databases, the model can intelligently resolve
terminology differences using predefined word relationships from a standard thesaurus
or dictionary. The Cambridge Scientific Abstracts Engineering Thesaurus [47] is
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one such reference for the WDN domain. It defines a set of standard hydraulic
access terminologies, the semantic categories to which they belong, and the semantic
relationships among them.
A sample SSM for a WDN is shown in Fig. 3.14, which for brevity presents











Figure 3.14: Summary Schema Model for WDN access terms.
At the bottom of the figure are the local databases (one for each autonomous
water district) that represent the sensor data, or databases with physical configuration
or historical information. The local schema associated with each local database is a list
of access terms, e.g., pump, reservoir, for the data within. Based on the definitions in
the engineering thesaurus, the summary schema can be formed by mapping the access
terms of lower-level nodes to their hypernyms and resolving semantic similarities
among these hypernyms. In linguistics, a hyponym is a word or phrase whose semantic
field is included within that of another word, which is a hypernym. In computer
science, this relationship is denoted as an “is-a” relationship; i.e., the hypernym
describes a semantic relation in which one word is a specific type of another. For
instance, the fact that a “reservoir” in the context of a WDN is a type of “source”
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describes the hyponymic relationship between these two access terms. Therefore, each
summary schema node is a logical database that contains meta-data representing the
abstract and essential contents of the local schemas of its children. As a result, higher
levels of the SSM have very compact schema.
3.4.2 Semantic Distance Metric. Fundamental to operation of the SSM
is the ability to quantify the semantic similarity of two terms. The semantic distance
metric (SDM) is defined to this end [48]. A general-purpose thesaurus can be used to
calculate the SDM for pairs of terms, but is of limited use in specialized applications
such as WDNs, as it cannot capture the technical nuances implied. As mentioned
in the previous section, a specialized dictionary or thesaurus can serve as a reference
for creating a hierarchy of hyponyms with synonym cross references between subtrees
of the SSM, facilitating the calculation of the SDM. Each subtree of the SSM is
comprised of individual meaning clusters or semantically-linked words.
The SSM is essentially a taxonomy composed of i) pairs of terms and ii)
hypernym and synonym links connecting these terms. The SDM is a weighted count
of the number of links between two terms, i.e., a large number of links implies that
two terms are relatively different in meaning. The weighting is necessary, because
different links represent different aspects of semantic similarity. As an example, a link
connecting synonyms has a lower weight than a hypernym/hyponym link, because
the former provides a more precise description of semantic closeness. Figure 3.15
demonstrates the calculation of the SDM for terms describing potential failures in
a WDN. Such a hierarchy could facilitate query of failure history databases. The
leaf-level terms are in the local schemas, and the upper-level terms are the summary
schemas.
If we assign a weight of 1 to all links, then the terms with SDM = 1 as imprecise
references to “pipe break” include “pipe burst,” “pipe cutoff” and “pipe corrosion.”


























Figure 3.15: Hierarchy of WDN failure terms.
SDM = 3 is “link down.” Beyond use of the engineering thesaurus, design of such
an SSM taxonomy can be based on knowledge of the application, experience with
and statistical analysis of previous queries, and even on the bias of the taxonomy
compiler [30], each of which can introduce subjectivity to a different extent.
3.4.3 Imprecise Queries. Imprecise queries allow users to specify data ref-
erences in their own terms, rather than the system’s predefined terms. By using the
SDM in the summary schemas hierarchy, imprecise data references to semantically
similar system access terms can be quantitatively compared. The SSM can be con-
figured to set the maximum SDM acceptable for a match - the higher this value, the
greater the tolerance for imprecision in the query terminology. In multidisciplinary
applications such as CPSs, it is prudent to allow for greater values of SDM, as the
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system design and implementation is carried out by practitioners from a diverse array
of backgrounds - each of which uses specific and possibly different terminology.
In the case of a WDN, queries can take place at any layer of the sensor in-
formation hierarchy defined on the ontology. Imprecise-query support eliminates the
need for knowledge of the location of or local access terms (the leaf nodes in Fig. 3.14)
for the data. Imprecise queries are denoted as such by the entity making them. When
this notation is identified, the summary schemas structure matches the reference to
the semantically closest precise reference, based on the SDM. From this point onward,
the imprecise query is processed as if it were a precise query.
More specifically, the SSM processes imprecise queries in a fashion similar
to that of precise queries, i.e., parsing the query, sending data access requests to
remote data sources, and combining the data accessed according to the operations
specified in the query. However, for imprecise queries, a reference resolution phase is
added between parsing the query and sending the remote access requests [30]. The
resolution involves a search that begins at the origin node of the query, and searches
upwards in the SSM hierarchy until a node is encountered that has a potential match
in its summary schema. The search continues downwards in the subtree rooted at the
potential match node. If an access term is found that is within the maximum SDM,
it is considered a match.
As a simple example of imprecise-query processing, Fig. 3.16 depicts the pro-
cedure for querying a multidatabase platform (which can include both history and
sensor databases) for information about WDN failure. The query issued may spec-
ify “link down” as the type of failure sought. The local access term, which is the
name used to describe the data in the local database, may be “pipe burst,” which is
more typically used in hydraulics. This difference in terminology can be resolved if
a maximum SDM of 3 or greater is specified. This enables the use of heterogeneous
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databases and sensor networks, without compromising the decision support carried
out by the cyber infrastructure.
Parse: parse query at origin node;
if all data references are precise then
go to Execute;
else
send query to immediately higher node in SSM hierarchy;
end
Resolve: foreach imprecise data reference do
calculate SDM for imprecise data reference and local summary schema;
if any local term is within max SDM of the imprecise data reference then
search subtree rooted at this node for access term that is within max SDM;
if such a term is found then
replace imprecise data reference with precise term;
else




Continue: if all data references in query are precise then
go to Execute;
else
else if root of SSM hierarchy has been reached then
reject query - nothing found within max SDM;
end
send query to immediately higher node;
go to Resolve;
end
Execute: execute query using standard multidatabase facilities;
Figure 3.16: Imprecise query processing algorithm for fault detection in a WDN.
As depicted in Fig. 3.2, the data retrieved as the result of the query is sent
to the agent for use in the decision support algorithm that will determine settings
for physical control devices such as valves. Computational techniques such as game
theory can be used to ensure that the settings are configured to prevent future re-
currence of the failure [15]. The agent can also trigger a sequence of actions that
lead to repair of the pipe, or can reroute water to avoid exceeding the capacity of
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downstream pipes. Our investigation of real-time feedback-based control carried out
by the cyber infrastructure of a WDN is reported in [9].
3.5 INTEGRATED CYBER-PHYSICAL SIMULATION OF A WDN
Simulation was fundamental to understanding the operation of the WDN, and
facilitated the development of the qualitative models. However, a simulator capable of
representing both the cyber and the physical infrastructures of the WDN could not be
identified. We proceeded to develop an integrated cyber-physical simulator for WDNs,
using EPANET 2.0 [8] and MATLAB to represent the physical infrastructure and
the decision support algorithms used to control the allocation of water, respectively.
EPANET can capture the layout of a WDN and track the water flow, pressure, depth
of water in tanks, and the concentration of given chemical substances. A simple model
created by EPANET is shown in Fig. 3.17, which includes all the necessary elements
of a physical WDN. The reservoir is the major component that provides water to
consumers that include tanks and junctions. The actuators are pumps (which control
the water pressure) and valves (which turn the water flow on or off). The legend of
Fig. 3.17 denotes the water level within the nodes or pipes.
Figure 3.17: A simple topology in EPANET.
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In the WDN depicted in Fig. 3.17, the reservoir is providing water to the tank
and a number of different junctions. The reservoir in this figure always contributes
water to the network, so its demand value is negative - in this case 9884.69 gpm. The
tank consumes the highest amount of water. Each junction is also labeled with its
demand value, and each pipe with its flow speed. The entire graph is color-coded
to simplify the categorization of demand or flow. The demand values of pumps and
valves vary in accordance with the nodes they control.
MATLAB has powerful computational capability and can support advanced
techniques, i.e., distributed decision support algorithms, for managing the water re-
sources. The procedure for simulation of a WDN with EPANET and MATLAB is








2. Parse report 
to extract input 
for algorithms




4. Output these 
settings as a 
.INP file
5. Provide this .INP 
file to EPANET as 
initial configuration
EPANET (simulator for physical infrastructure)
Matlab (simulator for cyber infrastructure)
Figure 3.18: Procedure for simulation of a WDN.
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4 ONTOLOGIES AND DECISION SUPPORT
In this section, we propose and validate a decision support system for WDNs
that makes use of cyber infrastructure for automated reasoning. The agent-based
paradigm introduced in Section 3 is extended to enable the use of ontologies in clas-
sification of failure events and identification of appropriate countermeasures. The
work presented in this section has been submitted to the Proceedings of the 45th
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, and is under review as of Aug.
2011. Extensions to this work planned for the immediate future include generaliza-
tion of the ontologies to other flow transport CPSs, including smart grids and ground
transportation networks.
The premise underlying the automated failure mitigation proposed in this
dissertation is that a database is available that associates a set of countermeasures
with a set of failure types. As an aside, we investigated data retrieval from such a
database, with the goal of determining the most efficacious search techniques. The
results of our investigation are presented in Appendix D and have been omitted from
this section in the interest of coherence.
4.1 FUNCTIONAL MODEL
The very first step in constructing a CPS ontology model is to identify the
major functional components of the system. Figure 4.1 depicts the six main func-
tional components of a CPS used for transporting a physical commodity. WDNs,
smart grids, and intelligent transportation systems can be abstracted in this fashion,
as they transport water, electric power, and vehicles; respectively. In such transport
systems, both discrete and continuous flows (the values of which can be quantized)
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are carried by passive entities, and controlled, commanded and monitored by actu-
ated components. The cyber components (where the agents reside) control both the
actuators (directly) and passive entities (indirectly), and provide intelligent decision
support for efficient management of the transport system. Figure 4.2 depicts the
instantiation of the functional model of Fig. 4.1 for a WDN.
Figure 4.1: Functional model of a CPS for commodity transport.
4.2 COMPONENTS IN WDN ONTOLOGY FRAMEWORK
On the basis of the use case diagram of Fig. 3.1 and the functional components
of Fig. 4.2, we present the building blocks of the ontology framework - the classes.
We use Prote´ge´ 4 [49] as the platform for creation of the WDN ontology.
4.2.1 WDN Ontology Class. The topmost classes of the WDN are shown
in Fig. 4.3, according to the functionalities identified in Fig. 4.2 and Fig. 3.1. The
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Figure 4.2: Functional model of WDN.
class Thing is the set containing all the subclasses, under which all other classes are
defined.
Figure 4.3: Topmost classes of WDN.
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Classes can be organized into a superclass-subclass hierarchy, which is quite
similar to a taxonomy. We adopt OWL-DL [50] in Prote´ge´ to define the superclass-
subclass relationships, which can be automatically computed by a reasoner and visu-
alized in diagrams. An automated reasoner can process and parse OWL-DL to un-
derstand the relationships among defined classes - specifically determining whether a
particular class is a subclass of another. The classes that we have defined in OWL-DL
for the WDN are presented in Figs. 4.4 to Fig. 4.9, where the superclass-subclass
relationships are clearly depicted.
The failure type class is created based on FMEA [46] and fault tree analysis
[51]. The Computer-System-Vulnerability class is adopted from an existing ontology
developed by the Resilience for Survivability group [52]. The mitigation technique
database is designed to address a broad range of failures, and makes reference to [53].
4.2.2 Automated Reasoning Based on Classes. An automated reasoner
can utilize the OWL-DL model to compute the inferred ontology class hierarchy, as
depicted in Fig. 4.10. The graph has been generated using OWLViz, a visualization
plug-in for Prote´ge´. The blue rectangle denotes the selection made when we query the
“Decision MakingFail Mitigation” class. The hierarchical ontology in OWL-DL facili-
tates identification of the superclass and subclasses of “Decision MakingFail Mitigation.”
The arcs representing “is-a” relationships have been denoted as such in Fig. 4.10.
As an example, a “PipeOverload” can be automatically identified as a type
of pipe failure. Once the failure type has been identified, the associated mitigation
technique can be determined, and countermeasures can be actuated for the physical
components. Identification of the appropriate mitigation technique takes place in
a top-down fashion, with higher-level classes being investigated before lower-level
classes [11].
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Figure 4.4: Ontologies for actuator class.
4.3 AUTOMATED FAILURE CLASSIFICATION AND MITIGATION
In OWL, properties describe relationships between classes or individuals -
instances of the class and the subclass can also be viewed as individuals of the super-
class. The two main types of properties in OWL-DL are “object” and “datatype.”
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Figure 4.5: Ontologies for passive entity, sensor network, and water network classes.
We illustrate the use of these properties in automatic classification and mitigation of
failure.
4.3.1 Object Properties for Behavior Reasoning. The object properties
specify relationships between two classes or individuals. By OWL-DL convention,
the properties are prefixed with the word “has” or “is” to clarify the meaning of the
property for humans; to take advantage of the “English Prose Tooltip Generator”,
which uses this naming convention where possible to generate more human-readable
class descriptions [49]; and to facilitate automated reasoning.
The properties we have defined for the WDN ontology are shown in Fig. 4.12.
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Figure 4.6: Continuous flow class.
We can further define characteristics for each object property to enrich its
meaning or to constrain its domain or range. More specifically, a property can be
characterized as one of the following [49]:
1. Functional: A functional property relates a given individual to at most one
other individual, e.g., “computer has command over actuator”, specifies that the
computer can send commands to the actuator, as opposed to directly exerting
control over the flow transported by the CPS.
2. Inverse functional: Properties that measure the inverse properties are func-
tional. For example, if we defined an “isCommandedBy” property, then it is
the inverse functional property of “actuator is commanded by computer.”
3. Transitive: If a property relates individual a to individual b, and also individual
b to individual c, then we can infer that individual a is related to individual c via
the same property. For instance, an actuator can be controlled by a computer,
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Figure 4.7: Subclasses of cyber entity class.
and a pipe (passive entity) can in turn be controlled by the actuator, therefore,
the “isControlledBy” property can be characterized as transitive.
4. Symmetric: When individual a is related to individual b via property P, and
vice versa; P is characterized as symmetric.
5. Asymmetric: Any property that is not symmetric is characterized as asymmet-
ric. Most of the properties in our WDN ontology are asymmetric.
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Figure 4.8: Failure type class.
6. Reflexive: A property that relates an individual to itself is characterized as
reflexive. For instance, in our ontology, the “MitigationTechniqueDatabase” is
reflexively related to “hasMitigationIdentification.”
7. Irreflexive: Individuals related by an irreflexive property cannot be the same.
The object properties can be further characterized with a domain and a range,
respectively. The object properties link classes (individuals) from the domain to
classes (individuals) from the range. In the relationship “computer has command
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Figure 4.9: Mitigation technique class.
over actuator”, the “computer” is the domain and the “actuator” is the range. The
domain and the range in OWL-DL are used as “axioms” in reasoning. It is worth
noting that an axiom is one of the main components of an ontology; others include
concepts, individuals and relationships. Figure 4.13 shows the characteristics and the
description of the domain and range of property “hasCommandOver”.
Figure 4.14 depicts an overarching map of the object properties that intercon-
nect various classes and subclasses in the WDN ontology. The map is automatically
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Figure 4.10: Deduced superclass and subclasses of “Decision MakingFail Mitigation.”
Figure 4.11: Failure type identification.
generated based on the “axioms” used in reasoning. Not all properties have been
reflected in this map; it is intended to demonstrate how object properties can be
used to infer relationships among different classes. Two types of arcs appear in
Fig. 4.14 - solid and dashed. A solid arc represents a “superclass-subclass” rela-
tionship, such as “software” and “algorithm.” A dashed arc represents an object
property, e.g., if the arrow on the arc between “Software” and “Continuous Flow”
is activated, then the object property is highlighted as “Software” hasAdvanced-
Computation of the “Continuous Flow”. Similarly, “WaterNetwork” hasFlow of the
“ContinuousFlow”; “SensorNetwork” hasMonitorOf the “ContinuousFlow”; “Cyber-
Entity” hasIntegrityDataOf “DataIntegrityCheck”; “Computer” hasCommandOver
“Actuator”; “MitigationTechniqueDatabase” hasSuggestionToComputation for “De-
cisionMakingSystem”; and the “Computer” can send three different types of control
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Figure 4.12: Top object properties.
Figure 4.13: Characteristics and description of an object property.
commands to the valve and the pump (subclasses of the actuator), including “hasIn-
creaseOriginalValue”, “hasDecreaseOriginalValue” and “hasMaintainOriginalValue”.
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Figure 4.14: Map of object properties in WDN ontology.
Figure 4.15 depicts the interaction of the major components of the cyber entity
class. In this example, once a failure is identified as being of the type “PipeOverload”,
appropriate countermeasures can be automatically identified and retrieved from the
mitigation techniques database. This is reflected by the connection between the
“hasMitigationIndentification” property and the failure type database. The miti-
gation technique database has the reflexive property “hasMitigationIdentification”
to facilitate identification of appropriate countermeasures. If a failure is identified
as being of type “PipeBurst”, the corresponding mitigation technique is determined
to be “Repair PipeBurst”. This class will mitigate the pipe burst failure through
the object property “hasPipeRepaired”. In the meantime, the mitigation technique
database will trigger decision support by “hasSuggestionTo Computation”, which
leads to computation of updated values for the actuator command.
4.3.2 Data Properties for Value Reasoning. Data properties link an
individual to an XML schema datatype value, i.e., they describe the type of relation-
ship between an individual and data values. For instance, we can use data properties
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Figure 4.15: Classes and object properties relevant to failure mitigation.
to describe the pressure value of the water flow, specify respective numeric ranges for
“high” and “low” flow pressure in a particular water consumption area, and deter-
mine whether the water allocated is sufficient. This judgment capability can be used
to improve the dependability of the WDN. For example, we can configure a threshold
value for the flow pressure, and once this threshold is exceeded (reflecting potential
failure), a mitigation technique can be identified and initiated.
We use “pressure” as an example to demonstrate automated reasoning for
values. Initially, we define a data property as “has-flow-pressure-value”, shown as
Fig. 4.16. We then create four instances within the “Pressure” class and define the
properties of each instance.
Figure 4.17 shows the data property definition for “Commercial-Area-Water-
Pressure”, which is “has-flow-pressure-value 400”. This specifies that the average
water pressure in a commercial area is approximately 400 pounds per square inch
(psi). Similarly, the average pressure values in industrial, residential, and suburban
areas are set to 700, 260 and 200 psi, respectively.
51
Figure 4.16: Definition of data property.
Figure 4.17: Data property assertion for an individual.
We further refine the use of data types by adding restrictions on possible
values. We define classes that specify a range of values in which we are interested; for
instance, particularly high pressure values that may indicate a failure. For example,
in Fig. 4.18, we specify that when the flow pressure is greater than 450 psi, then the
pressure is identified as a “HighWaterPressure” class. Similarly, “LowWaterPressure”
is specified as “has-flow-pressure-value equal to or lower than 200”.
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Figure 4.18: Definition of “HighWaterPressure.”
By automatically reasoning based on the data properties defined for each in-
dividual and the range specified for each property, the members (instances) of each
subclass can be intelligently added. In Fig. 4.19, the individual “industrial-area-
water-pressure” (700) is automatically added as a member of “HighWaterPressure”
that is more than 450.
Figure 4.19: Automated classification of an individual.
4.4 VALIDATION OF AUTOMATED FAILURE MITIGATION
In this section, we present and analyze an empirical test case used to vali-
date the automated failure mitigation technique of Section 4. The integrated cyber-
physical WDN simulator described in Section 3.5 was utilized. The sensor data was
53
generated by EPANET, which is used to simulate the physical infrastructure. Identi-
fication of the failure type is carried out using the ontology model, as is determination
of the corresponding failure mitigation technique. The automated reasoning proce-
dure is represented by an OWL-DL script; the reasoned result is converted into a
readable .txt format that can be parsed by MATLAB, which simulates the intelligent
decision support and determines appropriate settings for physical components. These
settings are fed back to EPANET, completing the control cycle.
4.4.1 Initial Configuration and Normal Operation. The topology
assumed in EPANET for the physical infrastructure is shown in Fig. 4.20.
Figure 4.20: Topology assumed for physical infrastructure.
Based on this topology (and the laws of hydraulics), EPANET determined the
initial demand (node labels) and flow (link labels) to be as depicted in Fig. 4.21.
The time span and time step of simulation are configured as 24 hours and 1
hour, respectively. Throughout the time span, it is possible to change the settings
configured for any component in the physical infrastructure, or for the system as
a whole. As an example, it is possible to set the value of “total head,” which is
the hydraulic head (sum of elevation and pressure head) of water in the reservoir
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Figure 4.21: Values of demand and flow at time 0.
and a required property for simulation. Fluids possess energy and the total energy
associated with a fluid per unit weight of the fluid is denoted as the fluid’s “head,”
which is expressed in units of height. On many occasions, energy needs to be added to
a hydraulic system to overcome elevation differences, friction losses, and other minor
losses. A pump is a device to which mechanical energy is applied and transferred to
the water as total head, therefore it can add more energy to the fluid. When no error
occurs in the simulation, the status of the nodes and links in each time span can be
displayed in EPANET. From the simulation results, shown in Fig. 4.22, it can be
concluded that when the total head is configured as 100 ft, reservoir 8 (node at the
bottom of the map) is operating normally at time 0.
The status of an actuator (a pump or valve) in different time slots can also be
observed. The pressure values at 0 and 10 hours, respectively, are as shown as node
labels in Figs. 4.23 and 4.24.
4.4.2 Failure Scenario and Automated Mitigation. Fault injection
was carried out to validate the automated failure mitigation technique. The specific
55
Figure 4.22: Status of reservoir 8 at time 0, when total head = 100 ft.
Figure 4.23: Pressure values (node labels) at time 0.
fault injected was decreasing the total head from 100 to 50 ft, which corresponds to a
failure at reservoir 8. This is because the total head is a energy parameter associated
with elevation. If the elevation of the reservoir can not sustain the updated total head
value, the excessive energy will be distributed to its neighbors. This energy release
can lead to excessive flow in neighboring links of the physical infrastructure, including
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Figure 4.24: Pressure values (node labels) at 10 hours.
both pipes and pumps. EPANET reflects this failure by displaying a warning message
with information about overloaded links, as shown in Fig. 4.25. The complete warning
message has been omitted in the interest of brevity.
Figure 4.25: EPANET warning message.
Detection of this failure by EPANET should trigger automated failure miti-
gation, using the ontologies introduced earlier in this section for identification of the
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failure type and determination of the appropriate countermeasure. As our fault in-
jection was limited to the physical infrastructure, the countermeasures applied are
changes in physical device settings. In the overload scenario described above, the
cyber infrastructure determines settings for actuators that regulate the water flow.
Identification of the failure type is the first step in failure mitigation, and takes
place based on the warning generated by EPANET. The information embedded in
the text file shown in Fig. 4.25 is interpreted to denote a failure caused by “exceeds
maximum flow,” which corresponds to the failure type of “Exceed Total Head”- a
node failure in the failure ontology of Fig. 4.8. The reasoning procedure that leads
to this determination is shown in Fig. 4.26.
Figure 4.26: Ontology-based reasoning for failure classification.
Once the failure type is identified, the associated countermeasure is determined
using the mitigation ontology of Fig. 4.9. A snapshot of the resulting mitigation
object is shown in Fig. 4.27.
The automated reasoning procedure (an OWL-DL script), from “failure iden-
tification” to “mitigation technique identification” is depicted in Fig. 4.28.
In our simulator, the selected countermeasures are recorded in an OWL-DL
text file, which can be parsed by MATLAB. For the failure scenario described, the
“Adjust TotalHead” countermeasure leads to configuration of the total head at reser-
voir 8 to 100 ft - the value under normal operating conditions. This value is calculated
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Figure 4.27: Characteristics and description of mitigation technique.
by MATLAB, and sent to EPANET as the input file shown in Fig. 4.29. The coun-
termeasure does not affect the “Pattern” (an option relevant to time specification),
and this value is left blank in the automatically-generated file.
Exertion of this countermeasure by EPANET, for a 24-hour simulation with
1-hour time steps (the same parameters as the normal operating case of Fig. 4.21)
led to results identical to those depicted in Fig. 4.22, verifying the effectiveness of
the countermeasure in restoring normal operation.
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Figure 4.28: Automated reasoning procedure for failure mitigation.
Figure 4.29: Countermeasures provided by MATLAB to EPANET.
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5 GAME-THEORY FOR DECISION SUPPORT IN WDNS
As an illustration of the utility of the tools and techniques proposed in earlier
sections of this dissertation, this section describes an agent-based environmental de-
cision support system that utilizes game theory to guide water allocation in a WDN.
Interacting agents can elect or decline to serve (provide water to) other agents. Re-
wards are associated with provision of service, to encourage cooperation by the agents.
A model is presented for this service game, and its Nash equilibrium is analyzed. The
work presented in this section was published in the Proceedings of the 44th Hawaii
International Conference on System Sciences in January 2011 [14].
5.1 MODEL OF THE SERVICE GAME
We define service in the model as provision of water to other agents. For
simplicity, we assume that an agent can submit only one service request and can
accommodate only one service request during a time slot. An agent’s status for a
given time slot is labeled as {푆푟푣} if it fulfills any of the requests received during the
time slot. The status of all agents and requests is disseminated throughout the system.
The cycle of service request and provision repeats indefinitely, which corresponds to
an infinitely repeated game, 퐺∞. The basic game being repeated, 퐺, is defined in
terms of the following items:
• Players: all peer agents that participate in water allocation; for tractability,
peer agents are assumed to be identical.
• Actions: each agent can decide for or against service provision, denoted as
{푆푟푣} and {퐷푐푙푛}, respectively.
• Preference of each player: represented by the expected value of a payoff function
determined by the action taken. When service is received by an agent, the payoff
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value of the agent denoted as utility, 푈 ; when the agent provides service, the
payoff value is denoted as cost, 퐶.
The reputation of a player, 푖, in a given time slot, 푡, is denoted by 푅(푡, 푖), and
depends on whether or not it provides service, both in the current time period and
in prior periods, as represented by Equation 5.1:
푅(푡, 푖) = 푅(푡− 1, 푖) ∗ (1− 푎) + (푤 ∗ 푎), 0 ≤ 푎 ≤ 1, 푡 ≥ 2 (5.1)
If service is provided by player 푖 in time period 푡, 푤 is set to 1, otherwise 0. The
reputation of all players is initialized as 0 at time 푡 = 0, and is defined as 푤 at 푡 = 1.
Therefore, 0 ≤ 푅(푡, 푖) ≤ 1 is always maintained. In Equation 5.1, parameter 푎 is a
constant that captures the strength of the “memory of the system,” i.e., the relative
importance of current vs. past behavior of an agent in determining its reputation.
5.2 NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF THE GAME
In the game, each player wants to gain the maximum benefit, leading to a
non-cooperative game. Nash equilibrium is reached when competition ends among
the players. This occurs when the collective set of actions taken by the players with
respect to service provision is locally optimum, i.e., no player can improve its utility
by electing a different strategy. The two types of Nash equilibria are pure and mixed.
Pure Nash equilibrium results when every player declines to serve, leading to a trivial
scenario that is not a sustainable operational state for a WDN. The mixed Nash
equilibrium, where players elect to serve in some time periods and decline service in
others, is the focus of our investigation.
In the mixed-strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium action profile, each player,
푖, elects to serve with probability 푝 and declines service with probability 1− 푝, with
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푝 > 0, meaning that either action is possible. We assume that each player can provide
service prior to requesting it.
The expected payoff value of electing to serve during period t is defined as:
Payoff(푆푟푣) = 푝 ∗ (−퐶 + 푅(푡, 푆푟푣) ∗ 푈) (5.2)
In Equation 5.2, the term (−퐶+푅(푡, 푆푟푣)∗푈) illustrates the tradeoff inherent
to service provision, namely, that cost of providing service as compared to the benefit
of receiving service. The term 푅(푡, 푆푟푣)∗푈 reiterates that the probability of obtaining
service in the current time period depends on a player’s reputation. This payoff value
of a player not only reflects its current payoff after providing service, but also captures
the potential to obtain service in the next period, through the inclusion of 푅(푡, 푆푟푣),
which can be used as a health indicator that reflects the capability of the player to
gain service in the near future. When service is provided, 푤 = 1; per Equation 5.1:
푅(푡, 푖) = 푅(푡− 1, 푖) ∗ (1− 푎) + 푎 (5.3)
Similarly, the payoff value of selecting the action {퐷푐푙푛} is:
Payoff(퐷푐푙푛) = (1− 푝) ∗ (푅(푡,퐷푐푙푛) ∗ 푈) (5.4)
The equation reflects the “no contribution, no cost” case. When service is
declined, 푤 = 0, and per Equation 5.1:
푅(푡, 푖) = 푅(푡− 1, 푖) ∗ (1− 푎) (5.5)
In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of finite games, each player’s expected
payoff should be the same for all actions. In other words, the respective payoff values
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for {푆푟푣} and {Dcln} are equal:
Payoff(푆푟푣) = Payoff(퐷푐푙푛) (5.6)
Substituting from Equations 5.2 and 5.4 yields:
푝 ∗ (−퐶 + 푅(푡, 푆푟푣) ∗ 푈) = (1− 푝) ∗ (푅(푡,퐷푐푙푛) ∗ 푈) (5.7)
Incorporating the iterative definition of reputation, from Equations 5.3 and
5.5, the probability of service provision, 푝, is determined as:
푝 =
푅(푡− 1) ∗ 푈(1− 푎)
−퐶 + 2푅(푡− 1) ∗ 푈(1− 푎) + 푈푎 (5.8)
5.3 C++ IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented the agent-based game-theoretic decision support system in
C++. The class diagram of the prototype is depicted in Fig. 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Class diagram of C++ implementation of agent-based decision support.
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string actions ({serve}, {decline});
int time interval t = 0;
int utility value U; //U can be initialized as 800
int cost value C; //C can be initialized as 10
double reputation of the node R; //R is constrained to (0,1)






(for t = 1; t<=10; t++;)
Receive request from agent 2 ({serve2} =1); //store the {serve} request from
Receive request from agent 3 ({serve3} =1); //different agents for further service provision
Provide service to agent 2 ();
Provide service to agent 3 ();
Increment own reputation (double R)
{
R (t) = R(t-1)*(1-a)+w*a; //store the current reputation value for further computing
};




Calculate payoff value (double payoff)
{
if {serve} = 1 then // case that agent 1 serves other agents
payoff {serve} = p*(-C+R(t)*U);
return (payoff{serve});





Figure 5.2: C++ code for Agent 1.
5.4 VALIDATION OF AGENT OPERATION
Experimental validation of the game-theoretic approach to water allocation
was carried out through MATLAB simulation of the three interacting peer agents
shown in Fig. 5.3. In this section, we are validating the operation of the cyber
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infrastructure (agents) only. Cyber-physical validation using our integrated simulator
is presented in Section 5.5.
Figure 5.3: Interaction among three peer agents.
The agents are labeled Node 푖, Node 푗, and Node 푘, respectively. For each
agent, the service strategy is as shown in Table 5.1. The strategy shown in Table 5.1
does not exhaustively capture all actions that could be taken by the three agents, but
it provides a representative set of actions over a non-trivial duration of ten time slots.
Table 5.1: Strategy for service game.
Time 푡 Node 푖 Node 푗 Node 푘
1 Serve 푗 Serve 푘 Decline
2 Decline Serve 푖 Decline
3 Serve 푘 Decline Decline
4 Decline Decline Serve 푖
5 Serve 푘 Decline Serve 푖
6 Serve 푗 Decline Serve 푖
7 Serve 푗 Serve 푖 Decline
8 Decline Decline Decline
9 Decline Decline Serve 푗
10 Serve 푘 Serve 푖 Decline
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According to Table 5.1, we can summarize the strategy of each player, 푖, as
푊푖 below:
• 푊푖 = [1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1]
• 푊푗 = [1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1]
• 푊푘 = [0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0]
5.4.1 Agent Reputation over Time. Firstly, based on the service
strategy, we investigate how an agent’s reputation varies in the 10 time slots by
following the equilibrium strategy described in Section 5.2. Figure 5.4 depicts the
changes in 푅(푡) for each of the three agents.
Figure 5.4: Change in agent reputation over time.
According to the strategies 푊푖, 푊푗, and 푊푘, respectively, the results show
that the reputation value increases when the service is provided by a particular agent
and decreases when the agent provides no service at all (or accepts service from its
peers). The equilibrium strategy maintains stability - over the 10 time intervals, the
three peer agents’ action, i.e., providing service or accepting service, will be similar
to each other. No one agent can be constantly acquiring or contributing service.
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5.4.2 Probability of Service Provision over Time. Secondly, we in-
vestigate how the probability of service provision varies over time. Simulation results
are shown in Fig. 5.5.
Figure 5.5: Probability of service provision.
According to Equation 5.8, 푝 varies in each time interval depending on the
agent’s reputation at the end of the previous time interval. As 푈 , 퐶 and 푎 remain
constant in this scenario, the agent’s reputation at the end of the previous time
interval is determined by its strategy, 푊 . If during the previous time interval, the
agent provided service, then in the next time interval, the probability of service
provision by the agent increases. If the agent did not provide service in the previous
time interval, then the probability of providing service decreases.
Another observation is that if an agent continuously provides service to its
peers, then the increase in probability of service provision within each interval, com-
pared with the previous interval, will actually decrease (indicated as the circle in the
figure for player 푘). This again demonstrates the role of the equilibrium strategy
in the resource allocation (service provision or acquisition), i.e., to restrain an agent
that is constantly providing or constantly obtaining service.
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5.4.3 Steady-State Behavior. An interesting question is whether steady-
state behavior of the water allocation game will settle on the service provision prob-
ability, 푝, of 0.5. Figures 5.6 through 5.11 provide valuable insight.
Figure 5.6 illustrates the case for player 푖, where 푈/퐶 = 80, 푎 = 0.2, and the
strategy for 100 time slots consists of repeating [1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1] [1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1] [0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0]. The maximum value reached by 푝 is 0.45.






















Figure 5.6: Probability of service provision, diverse strategy.
Keeping 푈/퐶 = 80, 푎 = 0.2, but changing the strategy of agent 푖 to 100 time
slots of repeating [1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1], the simulation result is as depicted in Fig. 5.7.
Similar to the case above, 푝 barely reaches 0.45.
In the third test case, we still have 푈/퐶 = 80 and 푎 = 0.2, but the strategy
of agent 푖 remains a constant 1 over 80% of the simulation time, which means that
agent 푖 is serving most of the time. The simulation result shown in Fig. 5.8 illustrates
that 푝 still does not reach 0.5.
In yet another experiment, we maintained 푈/퐶 = 80, but changed 푎 to 0.01,
corresponding to a system with a good memory (past actions of a player have strong
bearing over its reputation). With near-continuous service provision, the simulation
69






















Figure 5.7: Probability of service provision, monotonous strategy.






















Figure 5.8: Probability of service provision, near-continual service.
results were as depicted in Fig. 5.9, where unlike the aforementioned cases, 푝 reaches
0.5. Considering the factors that can affect 푝 in equation 5.8, we investigated the
situation where the 푈/퐶 ratio is changed to 8 and 푎 remains the same, the simulation
result in Fig. 5.10 shows that 푝 can reach 0.5.
Finally, we investigate the case that the agent is initially requesting service,
i.e., 푊 is 1 for the first third of the simulation time. The simulation results are
depicted in Fig. 5.11. Simulation results show that regardless of variations in 푈/퐶
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Figure 5.9: Probability of service provision, near-continual service, strong memory,
and 푈/퐶 = 8.




















Figure 5.10: Probability of service provision, near-continual service, strong memory,
and 푈/퐶 = 80.
and service strategy, when time goes to infinity, the value of 푝 is mainly determined
by the constant 푎, which reflects the importance of serving during the current period.
5.4.4 Reputation vs. Service Behavior. In addition to the probability
of service provision, 푝, we also investigate how the agent reputation, 푅(푡), changes
with variations in the strategy, 푊 . Simulation results are shown in Fig. 5.12, which
illustrates that the collaborative decision making strategy discourages continual pro-
vision of service by an agent.
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Figure 5.11: Probability of service provision, initial continual service request.



















Figure 5.12: Reputation of agent with near-continual service.
5.4.5 Reputation vs. Memory. For additional insight into the effect of
various parameters on the system operation, we vary 푎 to be 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8,
respectively to see how the reputation changes as 푎 changes. Figure 5.13 shows the
variations in the reputation of agent 푖 for different values of 푎. The same strategy,
푊 = [1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1], is used for the four groups of data.
As seen in Fig. 5.13, a larger 푎 will cause a more drastic change in the reputa-
tion during each time interval. This is because the constant 푎 plays a major role in
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Figure 5.13: Effect of 푎 on agent reputation.
terms of deciding the importance of service provision in determining the reputation,
푅(푡, 푖), of an agent (see Equation 5.1).
5.4.6 Accumulated Payoff vs. Service Behavior. The simulation
results depicted in Figs. 5.14 to 5.17 show that the accumulated payoff values for
{푆푟푣} and {퐷푐푙푛}, respectively, are quite close, regardless of changes in 푎. The service
ratio, defined as ratio of the accumulated payoff value for {푆푟푣} to the accumulated
payoff value for {퐷푐푙푛}, is 1.07, 0.95, 0.84 and 0.74, respectively, for 푎 = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6,
and 0.8.
Figure 5.14: Payoff value, 푎 = 0.2.
As depicted in Fig. 5.18, the variation in service ratio decreases as 푎 increases.
As seen in Equation 5.1, as 푎 increases, an agent’s reputation in the previous
time interval plays a less important role in determining the agent’s current reputation,
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Figure 5.15: Payoff value, 푎 = 0.4.
Figure 5.16: Payoff value, 푎 = 0.6.
Figure 5.17: Payoff value, 푎 = 0.8.
i.e., the system’s memory becomes weaker. As an agent’s reputation increases only
when it provides service to its peers, an increased 푎 can discourage the agent from
contributing service to the system, and hence lead to a decrease in the {푆푟푣}/{퐷푐푙푛}
ratio.
5.4.7 Accumulated Payoff vs. U/C . We also investigate how the payoff
value varies as 푈/퐶 varies. Figures 5.19 through 5.23 illustrate the payoff value for
each time period, for different 푈/퐶 ratios.
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Figure 5.18: Service ratio {푆푟푣}/{퐷푐푙푛} vs. a.


















Figure 5.19: Payoff value, 푈/퐶 = 1.1.
Figure 5.20: Payoff value, 푈/퐶 = 8.
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Figure 5.21: Payoff value, 푈/퐶 = 20.




















Figure 5.22: Payoff value, 푈/퐶 = 40.



















Figure 5.23: Payoff value, 푈/퐶 = 80.
The simulation results are summarized in Table. 5.2. The variation of 푈/퐶
from 8 to 80 leads to very little change in the service ratio, {푆푟푣}/{퐷푐푙푛}; however,
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when 푈 and 퐶 are nearly equal, as in they are in Fig. 5.19, the payoff value, and
hence the service ratio may become negative. If 푈/퐶 = 1, the payoff value explodes
to ∞.







5.4.8 Service Probability and Payoff vs. U/C . Finally, we investigate
the effect of 푈/퐶 on the probability of service provision and the payoff. Figure 5.24
depicts the probability of service provision for values of 푈/퐶 ranging from 40 to 120.
Figure 5.25 provides a more detailed view of the same simulation results.
Figure 5.24: Effect of 푈/퐶 on 푝.
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Figure 5.25: Detailed view of Figure 5.24
Dividing the numerator and denominator of Equation 5.8 by 퐶 yields:
푝 =
푅(푡− 1) ∗ (푈/퐶)(1− 푎)
(−1 + 2푅(푡− 1) ∗ (푈/퐶)(1− 푎) + (푈/퐶)푎 (5.9)
Figure 5.25 illustrates that the lower the 푈/퐶 ratio, the higher the probability
to of service provision. With a low 푈/퐶 ratio, an agent will achieve a lower payoff
value if it obtains service, as compared to the alternative action of providing service.
Therefore, a lower 푈/퐶 ratio can encourage agents to provide service rather than
obtain or decline service. However, the impact of 푈/퐶 on the probability of service
provision appears to be quite minor.
Figure 5.26 depicts the effect of 푈/퐶 on the payoff value. As seen in the
figure, the higher the 푈/퐶 ratio, the higher the payoff value will be within each time
interval. According to the expected payoff function for an agent in time period 푡, if
an agent provides service, the payoff value will be negative. The strategy represented
is 푊 = [1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1]. As depicted in the center of the figure, service provision
can help to increase the payoff value.
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Figure 5.26: Effect of 푈/퐶 on payoff value.
5.5 CYBER-PHYSICAL VALIDATION OF DECISION SUPPORT
In this section, we present results of using the integrated cyber-physical simu-
lator to validate the environmental decision support system of Section 5. This is an
effort to reflect dynamic behavior of the WDN and reveal interdependencies across
the cyber-physical boundary. The work presented in this section will appear as a
book chapter in late 2011 [16].
5.5.1 Topology for Integrated Simulation. The topology that we utilize
for validating the game-theoretical decision support is identical to that of Fig. 4.20.
Three agents were assumed to control the WDN, as shown in Fig. 5.27; where reservoir
1, tank 2, junction 5 and 7, pump 1 are in the same group; reservoir 8, valve 2, junction
3 and 4 are in the same group; and reservoir 9, junction 6 and valve 9 are in the same
group. A single actuator controls the physical components within the scope of each
agent.
5.5.2 Initial Configuration. Simulation results of node demand and link
flow, respectively; at the first hour (with a simulation time step of one hour) are
summarized in Fig. 5.28 and Fig. 5.29.
From Fig 5.28, we can infer that at 1:00 hour, reservoir 1 is providing water
(indicated by its negative demand value) and reservoirs 8 and 9 are retrieving water
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Figure 5.27: Scope of each of three agents.
Figure 5.28: Node demand (in gpm) at 1:00 hour.
(indicated by their respective positive demand values). Similar to the (purely cyber)
validation of agent operation in Section 5.4, we use 1 and 0 to denote an agent that is
serving and declining to serve water, respectively. Accordingly, in the first simulation
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Figure 5.29: Link flow (in gpm) at 1:00 hour.
period, the collective strategy of the three agents is (1, 0, 0). In the topology of
Fig. 5.3, we assume that reservoirs 1, 8, and 9 are nodes i, j and k, respectively.
Water attributes; e.g., demand, pressure, head, and flow, are controlled in
EPANET by actuators (pumps and valves). By sending a control command to the
actuator from the cyber infrastructure (implemented in MATLAB), we can configure
the operation of the node (reservoir) as “serve” or “decline”. As each of the three
actuators in Fig. 5.27 can be either open or closed, the eight combinations of Table 5.3
result.
Table 5.3 shows that two of the eight (actuator) configurations can lead to
failure. In other words, EPANET cannot continue simulation if pump 1, valve 2 and
valve 9 are either (open, open, open) or (open, closed, open), respectively. This is an
instance of failure propagation from the cyber to the physical infrastructure.
In Table 5.3, three water provision strategies are repeated: (1, 0, 0), (1, 1,
1) and (1, 0, 1). In other words, if the initial strategy is (1, 0 ,0), we configure
the subsequent strategy to be (1, 1, 1). Multiple actuator settings can be used to
achieve this strategy; for this case, we select the combination of (closed, open, open)
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Table 5.3: Result at time 0 with different configurations of actuators.
Reservoir 1 8 9 Result at 0:00 hr
Actuator Pump1 Valve 2 Valve 9
Status of
Actuator
Open Open Open Error. Pump 1 opens but
exceeds max flow at 0:00 hr.
Open Open Closed Reservoir 1 is serving, oth-
ers are not. [1,0,0].
Open Closed Open Error. Pump 1 opens but
exceeds max flow at 0:00 hr.
Closed Open Open All three reservoirs are serv-
ing at 0:00 hr [1,1,1].
Closed Closed Open All three reservoirs are serv-
ing at 0:00 hr [1,1,1].
Closed Open Closed All three reservoirs are serv-
ing at 0:00 hr [1,1,1].
Open Closed Closed Reservoirs 1 and 9 are serv-
ing, reservoir 8 is not [1,0,1].
Closed Closed Closed All three reservoirs are serv-
ing at 0:00 hr [1,1,1].
for pump 1, valve 2 and valve 9, respectively. The remainder of the settings remain
unchanged from the initial configuration. The control command file generated by
MATLAB (input .INP file to EPANET) is shown in Fig. 5.30, which reflects the
actuator configurations. As shown in the .INP file, the three actuators are configured
as (closed, open, open).
Figure 5.30: Actuator settings recommended to EPANET.
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5.5.3 Results and Analysis. Figure 5.31 shows simulation results for when
the actuators are configured as (closed, open, open) - the scenario that all reservoirs
are serving. In Fig. 5.31, the serving reservoirs are represented in blue and have a
negative demand value (in gpm).
Figure 5.31: Results of applying the recommended actuator settings.
The node demand and link flow at time 0, respectively; resulting from appli-
cation of the recommended actuator settings are shown in Figs. 5.32 and 5.33.
We further investigate the case that three reservoirs are consistently (through-
out the 10 simulation periods) providing water. Figure 5.34 depicts the demand value
of each reservoir for each simulation period.
Given the initial configuration, EPANET (which reflects operation of the phys-
ical infrastructure) can operate successfully. At time 0, all reservoirs are providing
water, but the water quantity provided by reservoir 1 is much higher than that of
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Figure 5.32: Node demand at time 0 when all reservoirs are serving.
Figure 5.33: Link flow at time 0 when all reservoirs are serving.
reservoirs 8 or 9. From 1:00 hour onwards, the water quantity provided by each of
reservoirs 8 and 9 has dramatically decreased, as the bulk of the water is provided by
reservoir 1.
Cyber-physical simulation of the decision support system demonstrates inter-
dependencies that can lead to fault propagation between the cyber and physical in-
frastructures. Incorrect configuration of the actuators may cause failures, as shown in
Table 5.3; due to constraints on the operation of physical components. The simulation
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Figure 5.34: Changes in demand values of reservoirs 1, 8 and 9.
results reiterate the need for caution in deploying CPSs for critical applications. De-
cision support algorithms have to be designed with knowledge of physical constraints,
to avoid causing failure in an otherwise operational physical system - defying the
purpose of using intelligent decision support.
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6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The goal of the research presented in this dissertation is to model, simulate,
and analyze the operation of a WDN, as a representative CPS. After careful study
of the literature, which articulates challenges to these tasks; we developed a qual-
itative multi-agent model capable of reflecting both cyber and physical aspects of
WDN operation, and more importantly, the interplay between the cyber and physical
infrastructures. After extending the multi-agent WDN model to represent semantic
interpretation of raw data, we enhanced the semantic model by utilizing SSM to rec-
oncile semantic heterogeneity among the data sources - enabling support for imprecise
queries. Qualitative modeling served as a precursor to quantitative analysis of the
WDN, with focus on system reliability and using a Markov chain model.
The insights gained from modeling were employed in developing ontologies that
represent and/or classify relationships among various aspects of the WDN, with focus
on classification of failure types and identification of corresponding countermeasures
for failure mitigation. These ontologies underpin automated reasoning that realizes
one of the main benefits of utilizing intelligent decision support for physical system
operation: increasing the robustness of the system against failure, by facilitating self-
healing measures that do not rely on human operators for mitigating the effects of
failure. To validate our methods, we developed and utilized a simulator capable of
representing, with high fidelity, the operation of cyber and physical components and
the interplay between them.
As an illustration of the practical utility of our techniques, we described and
validated a decision support system that used game theory as an algorithmic tool for
water allocation in a WDN. Correct operation of the decision support system, and
the resulting cyber-physical WDN was validated using simulation.
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A future extension planned for this research is to generalize the models and
methods developed in this dissertation to CPS domains other than water distribution,
in particular smart grids. This requires extensive study and analysis of the attributes
and functionalities of these CPS domains, and identification of their commonalities
with and differences from WDNs. The context of any CPS can be decomposed into
the physical-level context, i.e., the concrete device and data level; and conceptual-
level context, i.e., the abstract decision support and algorithm level. We plan to
specify the context of a generic CPS in terms of these two levels. Generic context
specification will facilitate the extension of our model to these domains, and is planned
as a research task. Ontologies are expected to be very helpful in achieving this goal,
which requires understanding of the semantics of each CPS domain.
Another extension is validation of the models and methods of this dissertation
with field data. The validation carried out thus far relies on simulation alone. Field
data will also be used to refine and validate our quantitative analysis. Currently, the
state transition probabilities in our Markov chain model for both intelligent and purely
physical WDNs have been estimated based on understanding of WDN operation and
study of hydraulics literature. We have identified an industry collaborator and will be
acquiring field data that will enable more accurate estimation of these values. This
will facilitate more meaningful assessment of the effect of the cyber infrastructure on
the reliability of water allocation. The penultimate goal is to develop a quantitative
model for reliability and security of CPSs, which would guide the deployment of these
systems and alleviate concerns about their dependability.
APPENDIX A
FURTHER QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF A WDN
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This appendix articulates further detail of the qualitative WDN model pre-
sented in Section 3.1.
In qualitative modeling of agent-based WDNs, we utilize UML to capture
static and dynamic aspects of the system.
1. Class Diagram Based on the use cases and interconnections defined in Fig. 3.1,
Fig. A.1 provides an overview of different classes in the WDN, along with the
specified attributes and the corresponding methods for each class. Figure A.1
also depicts how the classes interrelate. Other information provided in Fig. A.1
includes the data types of the attributes and the main constraints used in the
decision making algorithm. The attributes of the water facility classes have
been chosen to be most representative of both static (elevation) and dynamic
aspects (head loss, a description of water energy) of water.
Figure A.1: Class diagram of a WDN.
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The Data Integrity Checking class takes three data streams, from Sensor, Phys-
ical System Configuration and History Database, respectively. Data collected
by the sensors is aggregated by the multiplexor (representing by the small dia-
mond) and sent for data integrity checking. The Physical System Configuration
block specifies the basic configuration and topology physical water infrastruc-
ture. This configuration data is sent to Data Integrity Checking to assist in
evaluating physical constraints, e.g., judging whether a newly requested water
value (such as quantity) will exceed the capacity of a pipe. History data can
be queried by the Data Integrity Checking for comparing abnormal real-time
data with historical values. Various types of semantic analysis are carried out
through Intelligent Semantic Inference, including the aforementioned evalua-
tion of physical constraints and corroboration with historical data or data from
nearby nodes.
The purpose of this semantic inference is to screen out illegitimate or corrupted
data (based on the preliminary judging criteria), to ensure that only legitimate
data is sent to the decision making algorithm. The agent has varied types of
association with other classes: it receives the data after semantic processing,
stores the data in the history database or queries data from the database to
assist in decision making (bidirectional), negotiates resource allocation with
other agents, and exerts control over actuators (valves and pumps). All these
functionalities are implemented through running the advance Decision Support
Algorithm in the agent.
2. Component Diagram In Fig. A.2, the main program that implements water
allocation executes on the cyber infrastructure. The physical location of the
main program is immaterial. The main program is directly dependent on the
code specification, which is the head file of the agent class. It includes prototype
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information for the class function. The remainder of the script is the package
body, which exhibits functionality similar to that of the main program and
executes in distributed fashion within its autonomous management scope. For
instance, if the script is written in C++, the package body is a .cpp file. An
independent database is attached to each script, meaning that the script can
only retrieve data from or store data to the database for management purposes
within its own scope. All the data sent to the script for advanced semantic
analysis or advanced computation during the phase of decision making has been
checked its integrity, as described earlier in this section.
Figure A.2: Component diagram of a WDN.
3. Activity Diagram
In Fig. A.3, which depicts the activity diagram for a WDN, three entities are
involved, including the physical networks; agent 1, acting as the main agent;
and agent 2 as the agent interacting with agent 1.
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Figure A.3: Activity diagram of a WDN.
The activity diagram reflects how an agent interacts with the environment, and
how the values in the associated object change after date integrity checking
and data processing. For instance, the raw data is changed into semantically-
processed data for control, and the requested water quantity of one agent may
affect another agent’s water consumption quantity.
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4. Sequence Diagram
Figure A.4 depicts the sequence of messages exchanged among different entities
in the WDN. The message on the line shows the method adopted by the receiver
(class defined in the class diagram) upon receiving the message.
Figure A.4: Sequence diagram of a WDN.
The figure shows the sequence of data received by the data integrity checking
object and the decision support algorithm object of agent. For the former
object, it directly receives and checks the raw data from the sensors (collected
by multiplexor) and then if it needs to compare the real-time data with previous
history data, it will receive data from its local database to make sure the result
of checking is based on a reliable history record. The water consumer object
and the adjacent agent object are eliminated after they send the return message,
which means that no message from these two objects will be accepted outside
of particular periods. The decision support algorithm of the agent first receives
checked sensor data first, queries data from the history database, and finally
communicates with the adjacent agent. Such a sequence is from the physical
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infrastructure to the cyber infrastructure (bottom-up). After the decision has
been made, the calculated result will be sent to the community agent first,
then a command will be sent to actuator to exert real-time control over the
physical commodity, and finally the calculated data is recorded as history data
in the database. Such a sequence is from the cyber network to the physical
infrastructure (top-down), culminating in data recording.
APPENDIX B
FURTHER QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF A WDN
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This appendix elaborates on the quantitative analysis presented in Section 3.2.
We used the analysis editor provided by SHARPE to configure the scenarios
simulated for the Markov model. These scenarios are given in Table B.1. The Reward
rate REW denotes the reward, based on the contribution to the intelligence of the
system. Simulation results are presented in Table B.2.
Table B.1: Scenarios simulated for Markov model of an intelligent WDN.
Label Configuration Group
Down State (Down1) decision fail
Down State (Down2) pipe bursts and actuator fail
Down State (Down3) pipe bursts
Down State (Down4) sensor fail
Down State (Down5) sensor fail and check fail
Up State (UP1)
Components operational
but no actuator repair
Up State (UP2)
Components operational
but no pipe repair
Up State (UP3)
Components operational
but no actuator repair
or pipe repair
Initial Probability (INI)
new quantity 0.5, sensor working 0.1
decision making: 0.05, actuator working:0.05
agent community: 0.1, pipe working: 0.2
Reward rate(REW)
new quantity: 5, sensor working: 2
decision making: 20, DB store: 7
actuator working: 2, sensor fail: -2
agent community: 10, decision fail: -15
actuator fail: -2, actuator repaired: 3
pipe bursts: -4, pipe working: 4
pipe repaired: 5, data check: 12
check fail: -10
The main purpose of this quantitative assessment exercise is to determine
the value of the cyber infrastructure, in terms of added reliability of the WDN, as
compared to its purely physical counterpart. The numeric results confirm that the
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Table B.2: Numerical simulation results of an intelligent WDN.
Parameter Results Configurations
Transient Unavailability
7.25e-003 Down 1 INI at 100 sec
1.18e-002 Down 2 INI at 100 sec
5.91e-003 Down 3 INI at 100 sec
3.47e-003 Down 4 INI at 100 sec
1.29e-002 Down 5 INI at 100 sec
Down Time
3.81e+003 sec Down1
6.18e+003 sec Down 2
3.11e+003 sec Down 3
1.83e+003 sec Down 4
6.81e+003 sec Down 5




Expected reward at time t(Exrt) 8.66e+000 REW, INI at 100 sec
greater the number of failures, the higher the Transient Unavailability. For instance,
the value in Down 2 (1.18e-002) is much higher than the value in Down 3 (5.91e-
003). For the most critical failure, which is the “decision making fail”, the Transient
Unavailability is 7.25e-003. This value is better than the case in Down 3 (5.91e-003)
but not better than the case in Down 4 (3.47e-003). The Down Time refers to the
period of time when a system fails to perform its primary function. The results
confirm that the greater the number of failure states, the longer the Down Time. The
case in Down 5 is the worst case, as both the sensor and the data integrity check have
failed. The resulting Down Time is the longest (6.81e+003 sec). The second worst
case is Down 2 (6.18e+003 sec), where “pipe bursts” and “actuator fail” occur.
The shortest MTTSF occurs when both “pipe repair” and “actuator repair”
fail, confirming that these repair mechanisms can extend the life of the system (by
50% in this case). We use the expected reward rate at time t (Exrt) to measure
the reward rate of the overall system, based on the intelligence weight assigned to
each state, which is in turn based on the contribution of the state to the intelligence
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of the system. For example, “decision making” has the highest reward rate (20).
Similarly, as software failure will consider-ably affect the intelligence of the system,
the reward rate of “decision fail” is high (-15). In a purely physical WDN, a local
node can exchange water with its neighboring nodes, which can in turn interact with
each other. However, this exchange is not controlled by agents, and therefore no
intelligent decision support or failure prevention measures exist.
The configuration of parameters in SHARPE and the simulation results for
the purely physical WDN are shown in Table B.3 and Table B.4, respectively. Like
the intelligent WDN case, the Exrt denotes the expected reward rate at time t and
the Mean time to absorption denotes the state failure.
Table B.3: Scenarios for purely physical WDN.
Label Configuration Group
Initial Probability (INI 1)
new water quantity: 0.5, neighbor 1:0.2
neighbor 2:0.1, actuator control:0.2
Initial Probability (INI 2)
new water quantity: 0.4, neighbor 1:0.2
neighbor 2:0.1, actuator control:0.2
sensor detection:0.1
Reward rate(REW 1)
new water quantity: 5, neighbor 1:2
neighbor 2: 2, pipe bursts:-3
actuator control:10, sensor detection:7
actuator fail:-9
Reward rate(REW 2)
new water quantity: 5, neighbor 1:2
neighbor 2: 2, pipe bursts:-3
actuator control:15, sensor detection:7
actuator fail:-12
The numerical results show that the system reliability decreases dramatically
as time goes by, in both configurations, as expected of a system with no repair. As
the “actuator control” is the sole component that can exert intelligent control, it
has been assigned the highest reward rate (10 in REW 1 and 15 in REW 2 ). The
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Table B.4: Numerical simulation results of purely physical WDN.
Parameter Results Configurations
Reliability
7.83e-003 INI 1 at 20 sec
6.39e-006 INI 1 at 50 sec
3.28e-008 INI 2 at 100 sec
7.16e-003 INI 2 at 20 sec
5.86e-006 INI 2 at 50 sec
3.28e-008 INI 2 at 100 sec
Mean time to system failure (MTTSF)
4.07e+000 INI 1 pipe bursts
3.94e+000 INI 1 sensor detection
4.06e+000 INI 2 pipe bursts
4.02e+000 INI 2 sensor detection
Expected reward rate at time t (Exrt)
4.48e+000 REW 1 INI 1 at 100 sec
4.67e+000 REW 1 INI 2 at 100 sec
5.08e+000 REW 2 INI 1 at 100 sec
5.22e+000 REW 2 INI 2 at 100 sec
main difference between REW 1 and REW 2 is the increase of the reward rate for
“actuator control” and the decrease of reward rate for “actuator fail” in REW 2. The
result shows that the configuration in REW 2 can enhance the Exrt of the system,
and if “sensor detection” takes place at the beginning of the simulation, the Exrt
further increases. This is due to the fact that a sensor is an intelligent device and can
contribute to the intelligence of the physical system; the earlier the sensor can play
this role, the more it can contribute to the Exrt.
APPENDIX C
INTEGRATED SIMULATION OF A COMPLEX WDN
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Results of integrated cyber-physical simulation of a WDN with a simple phys-
ical topology were presented in Section 3.5. Simulation of a more complex physical
infrastructure is presented in this appendix.
Figure C.1 shows a screen capture at hour 8:00 of a 24-hour simulation period
of a WDN. This figure also depicts node groupings, circled in green, that can facilitate
study of a subset of the nodes in the topology.
Figure C.1: A more complex topology and node groupings in EPANET.
After simulating the system for the specified duration, EPANET can provide
a report in graph, table, or text form. Among the various reports available, the
full report provides the most comprehensive data, including the initial and updated
values of all properties of the nodes and links within each simulation time step (one
hour by default). The water flow, pressure at each node, depth of water in tanks and
reservoirs, and concentration of chemical substances can be tracked from the recorded
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data. In Fig. C.2, Figs C.2(a) and C.2(b) present snapshots of the link and node
information, respectively, of the full report.
(a) Link information from full report. (b) Node information from full report.
Figure C.2: Component information from full report.
The full report generated as the output file of EPANET is automatically saved
as a plain-text .NET file. This information includes values required as input by
the decision support algorithms of the cyber infrastructure, which in turn determine
settings for physical control elements such as valves.
To simulate the provision of sensor readings and other information about
the physical infrastructure to the cyber control system, the full report generated
as output by EPANET needs to be provided as input to MATLAB. This necessitates
pre-processing of the file, and parsing of the data into the matrix form required by
MATLAB. A script using the textscan and cell2mat commands can be defined within
MATLAB to carry out this pre-processing to generate a separate matrix from the
EPANET data for each entity (node or link) for each simulation time step recorded
in the full report, e.g., hour 1:00.
For simplicity, the simulation presented in this dissertation was focused on
node flow. The controller (pump or valve) settings were determined by averaging the
node demand within a node group, which is a subset of nodes defined in EPANET.
Figure C.1 shows a number of groups. The same parsing approach can be used to
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extract additional data, e.g., water pressure or concentration of a given chemical, from
the EPANET report, as required by more sophisticated decision support algorithms.
Each node group can reflect an associated group of consumers, such as resi-
dential nodes in the south of a city. The only requirement is that each node group
include at least one controller (pump or valve), so controller settings determined by
the cyber infrastructure can be utilized in water allocation. The focus of the research
presented in this dissertation was integrated simulation of the CPS, and as such, a
simplistic approach was taken to water allocation, with the goal of distributing the
water as equitably as possible, subject to physical constraints on the nodes.
MATLAB generates a matrix of controller settings, which need to be provided
to EPANET, as they would be to the physical control elements in an actual WDN. A
.INP file is required, in a format identical to the original input provided to EPANET
in the first step of the simulation, with controller values updated to reflect the set-
tings determined by the decision support algorithm. A MATLAB script utilizing the
dlmwrite and fprintf commands can be used to generate a .INP file with the format
expected by EPANET.
In the final stage of the simulation, the .INP file generated by MATLAB, which
specifies settings for various control elements, is used to initiate another execution
of EPANET, closing the physical-cyber-physical loop. The process can be repeated
as necessary to simulate operation of the WDN over multiple cycles of cyber control.
Figure C.3 shows the file resulting from execution of the water allocation algorithm
for the node groups of Fig. C.1.
The result of executing EPANET with the .INP file generated by MATLAB is
shown in Fig. C.4. As an example of the manifestation of cyber control, the flow in
the link connecting Junction1 (J1) and SOURCE, marked with an arrow, has been
reduced from 75-100 gpm (yellow) in Fig. C.1 to 50-75 gpm (green) in Fig. C.4.
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Figure C.3: EPANET input file generated by MATLAB.
Figure C.4: Complex topology after applying cyber control.
APPENDIX D
INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFICACY OF DATA RETRIEVAL FROM A
FAULT MITIGATION DATABASE
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The premise underlying the automated failure mitigation proposed in this dis-
sertation is that a database is available that associates a set of countermeasures with a
set of failure types. In this appendix, we utilize rank-weight-biased precision (RWBP)
to measure the effectiveness of data retrieval from such a database, in the hope of
determining practices most likely to lead to an efficacious search. The work described
here will be submitted in August 2011 to the Track on Dependable and Adaptive
Distributed Systems (DADS) of the ACM Symposium on Applied Computing [19].
D.1 MOTIVATION
What we have presented in [11] and [14] are the semantic agents and SSM
model, which allow us to interpret the semantics in the data stream and reconcile
heterogeneity in the semantics in the query. One of the greatest benefit lying in SSM
model is the tolerance of imprecise query on the failures. When an imprecise query
is interpreted, the embedded information of failure is classified on certain position on
the taxonomy (a type of ontology) of failure type database, as shown in 4.8 and mea-
sured by SDM in 3.15. Once the failure type has been identified, the corresponding
mitigation techniques can be found by the help of ontology reasoning [17]. The failure
can have a large number of available mitigation techniques, if it locates at the higher
level on the taxonomy, such as a broad category like a “NodeFail”. On the other
hand, a specific failure type can have very limited number of mitigation techniques,
if it locates at lower level on the taxonomy, such as “ExceedTotalHead” at the root
of failure type database.
SSM model can greatly reduce the heterogeneity in the useful semantic infor-
mation extracted from raw data collected by sensor. The performance evaluation of
SSM has been extensively discussed in Section 3.4, but limited discussion is carried
on the precision of the interpretation, i.e. how much uncertainty incurred when the
failure is classified on the taxonomy.
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Both of the failure type taxonomy and the mitigation technique taxonomy
discussed in Section 4 are represented by set of data and stored in database. As
a CPS is a purely automatic system without human intervention, we assume that
system takes the role of human operator completely. The system can automatically
interpret the query, classify the failure type on the predefined taxonomy, scan the
mitigation technique in the mitigation database according to the identified failure
type, stop at one mitigation technique and select it as the appropriate one for the
failure type. As discussed above, based on the semantics in the query, when the
classification of failure on the taxonomy has reached certain level on the taxonomy, a
relatively narrow data pool with multiple mitigation techniques are associated with
one failure type. Each mitigation technique can be abstracted as data in the database,
with different usefulness to resolve that particular failure characterized in different
weight. The system needs to select which data is a good solution and decides when
to stop retrieving the data from the pool. The system does not necessarily look for
all the data available in the data pool, as it can not feasibly seek all data in a large
mitigation database (more than one million data) for a high-level failure.
The quantification of the lost reliability due to the acceptance of imprecise
queries, which add more uncertainty in the complex CPSs, is not discussed in this
section. What we focus on is the process beyond the point that one failure type has
been identified on the taxonomy of failures, and we investigate at the effectiveness of
data retrieval when the system selects the available option from data pool. Figure
D.1 depicts the scenario about how system selects the available mitigation technique
to address an identified failure in the failure database. It shows that SSM resolves the
problem of imprecise query but introduces the uncertainty. After a failure is identified,
the system starts to automatically select the available mitigation technique from the
database. The distribution of the available mitigation techniques and the usefulness
of each data are unknown by the system.
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Figure D.1: Unreliability introduced in the imprecise query and data selection.
In this section, we measured the effectiveness of data retrieval in the mitigation
search-and-selection phase, given different data distribution cases and search ways.
The simulation reveals how to configure the system can result in a cost-effective
search, which is quite meaningful as the determination of the selected data is the
final stage of the “query-retrieval” process. The empirical result can facilitate more
effective configuration of the system for automatic operation. Because selection is a
random process, a statistical model is suitable to capture the uncertainty in the data
retrieval phase. We utilized the theory developed for the information retrieval system
in [54] to capture the uncertainty in this process.
D.2 BACKGROUND ON INFORMATION RETRIEVAL SYSTEM
Information retrieval system needs to compute a score to represent the degree
of satisfaction between the selected data and a query. Specifically, each score is a
numeric estimation about the probability that how much the selected data matches
with the information (semantics) embedded in the query. The semantics in the query
have been interpreted by SSM, and on the basis of the selected failure, we can quantify
the effectiveness of data selected from mitigation database. All the available data has
an associated weight.
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The two notations in the information retrieval theory are total number of
relevant documents for the query (R) and total number of retrieved documents (d).
Here, a document refers to a single data in the database, and we use it in the remaining
part of this section to conform to the terminology in information-retrieval theory. It
is often the case that R is larger than d, which implies that system can only feasibly
check part of the relevant documents rather than all of the documents that match
with system’s query.
The recall and precision are the two well-known elementary notations for mea-
surement. Their definitions are illustrated as Fig. D.2. Recall is the proportion of
the relevant documents that have been retrieved, i.e. C/R, while precision is the
proportion of retrieved documents that are relevant, i.e. C/d. These two concepts
tend to be in tension.
Figure D.2: Retrieved vs. relevant information in database.
Most of the existing studies towards the information retrieval effectiveness
measure the average precision (AP), precision at d documents retrieved (P@d), R-
precision (P@R) and reciprocal rank (RR). All these measurements require the knowl-
edge of R, which is unknown in some cases. Besides, the existing measurement meth-
ods have shortcomings due to other two facts: i)complete relevance judgments are
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impractical in current system and the recall tends to be overestimated; ii)recall, as
an overall evaluation of relevant documents, does not capture the notions that the
system selects data randomly and the behavior of search can stop at any relevant
document.
Given a document ranking, i.e. the sequence of documents, we use rank-weight-
biased precision (RWBP) to measure the data retrieval effectiveness in the system.
The benefits are summarized as follows:
1. It measures the rate at which data usefulness is gained by a system working
at a given degree of persistence, measured by advanced probability p that the
system continues to search for the next relevant data. The higher the degree of
persistence, the more data that the system will look for before stops and selects
the data. The probability of continuous searching can be previously configured
in the system.
2. By adjusting the persistence p, a parameter (RWBP) that represents the effi-
ciency of system searching behavior has the advantage of capturing the critical
facets of other measurements, including AP, RR and P@d.
3. RWBP allows quantification of effectiveness when only partial relevance judg-
ments are available, specifically, the system does not need to query all the
relevant data residing in the database.
4. RWBP takes the weight of each data into consideration.
D.3 MODEL
For the intelligent WDN case, all the available mitigation techniques for all
types of failures reside in the database in parallel, i.e. there is no priority to retrieve
any one of them when the system performs searching automatically. We suppose the
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data retrieval is performed like a scan from left to right as shown in Fig. D.3. The
system only has an identified failure type, and has no awareness of the distribution
of the useful mitigation techniques, which are scattered randomly in a huge database
system. The dashed line indicates the available mitigation technique is a weak one
for resolving the failure, while the solid line indicates a strong one.
Figure D.3: Multiple mitigation techniques for one failure type.
We suppose for each of the mitigation technique, it has an associated effi-
ciency value measured by weight (from 0 to 1). The efficiency value is evaluated
and assigned by the experts in the design phase of the system beforehand, based on
the previous accumulated experience on the usefulness of one particular mitigation
technique to address a particular failure. Sometimes, certain mitigation technique
can resolve various types of failures, for instance, “Adjust Pressure” can resolve the
failures such as “ExceedPressure” and “PipeBurst”, with different efficiency. For the
strongest mitigation technique, its utility to the system is 1 (a unit to measure the
effectiveness of the mitigation technique that addresses the failure). For the weakest
or irrelevant one, its utility is 0. The deeper that the system searches through the
ranked documents (the mitigation technique profile), the more utility that the system
can gain. If the total number of researched documents is high, the total utility will
be increased as well.
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Introduction of probability p captures the notion of “expected search length
per desired relevant documents” or “rate at which relevant documents are found”.
We assume that p is a constant for each movement forward. We also assume that
the stop of searching is determined independently of the position in the ranking,
independently of the previous decision, and irrelevant of the weight of the document
just searched. In the intelligent WDN case, the system has no cache for storing the
weight of previous searched results, therefore, it has no sorting process. Given the
advanced probability p of seeking appropriate document in the database, the behavior
of the system is described by the algorithm in Fig. D.4.
{int retrieved_doc = d; //d is the number of retrieved documents
int relevant_doc = R; //R is the number of relevant documents
if R < d
d-- until d <=R; //We suppose that the number of
//retrieved documents in query should be less than the
//available relevant documents in the system
//Start seeking the relevant document
int i; //counter of the retrieved documents
double w; //weight of mitigation technique to address failure
double p; //proceeding probability
double U = 0; //total utilities of the retrieved documents
for (i = 1;;i <= d;)
{
if i++, // counter increases to proceed retrieval
then proceed to view next doc in the ranked list with p;
if w > 0, //indicate the mitigation technique is useful
add the utility of mitigation technique into
total utility U with associated probability p;
if i stops,
finish searching, calculate utilities;
}
} //end searching
Figure D.4: System search behavior given advanced probability p.
According to the algorithm in Fig. D.4, the probability that the counter i will
reach to the 푖푡ℎ document is 푝푖−1. On average, the number of documents examined




푖 ⋅ 푝푖−1 ⋅ (1− 푝) = 1
1− 푝 (D.1)




푤푖 ⋅ 푝푖−1 (D.2)
The expected rate at which utility is transferred from the automatic searching
service provider is the total utility divided by the average number of searched docu-
ments, i.e. the RWBP in Equation D.3. RWBP should be within the range from 0
to 1.
푅푊퐵푃 = 푈/푁 =
∑푑
푖=1푤푖 ⋅ 푝푖−1∑푑
푖=1 푖 ⋅ 푝푖−1 ⋅ (1− 푝)
(D.3)
D.4 SIMULATION RESULTS
We utilize MATLAB to simulate the searching behavior of the system given
different ranks and advanced probabilities.
D.4.1 N, U, RWBP for Four Probabilities of Continuous Search.
We design three different ranks and associated weights to observe how the system
behaved.
Initially, we suppose the rank and associated weight as below, with relevant
documents R = 7 and total retrieved documents d = 14. In real application case,
the relevant documents and total retrieved documents can be very large, such as
thousands or millions available documents in the database [54]. However, for a failure
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type that has been identified in the water distribution case, the number of matched
mitigation techniques are limited, and R = 7 is a reasonable assumption.
Ranking1: -♣-♣♣-♣♣♣-♣– (♣ represents relevant document)
Weight1 of each: [0, 0.1, 0, 0.3, 0.5, 0, 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.8, 0 ,0.7, 0, 0]
The rank shows that the distribution of relevant documents is quite even.
Given four different probabilities, p1 = 0.25, p2 = 0.5, p3 = 0.8, p4 =0.95, we can
calculate corresponding average number of documents(N ), total utilities (U ), and
RWBP values.
The average number of documents (N ) is straightforward to be obtained. As
the factor of d goes to infinity, the higher probability, the higher N will be, indicating
the more persistently the system searches, the more documents the system retrieves.
The calculated (N )s are N1 = 1.33, N2 = 2, N3 = 5, N4 = 20.
The results of total utilities for four probabilities are shown in Fig. D.5. As
the number of retrieved documents increases, the higher the probability to continue
searching, the higher the total utilities will be gained. Higher weight has higher
contribution in the total utilities, even though the relevant documents can appear
late.
Figure D.5: Total utilities for weight1.
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RWBPs for four probabilities during simulation are shown as Fig. D.6. When
p = 0.25 and p = 0.5, the variation of RWBP is similar. RWBP in p = 0.5 is always
higher than the one in p = 0.25, almost twice after d = 3. When p reaches 0.8,
RWBP begins to surpass the one in p = 0.5 when d = 4, but even less the one in
p = 0.25 before d reaches 4. As p approaches to 0.95, RWBP is the lowest among
all the four cases, but starts to surpass the one in p = 0.5 when d = 9, and it is
anticipated that it has a tendency to surpass RWBP in p = 0.8 at certain d. This
tells us that, for an evenly-distributed rank, a low advanced probability might be
more cost-effective for the case that system searches at shallow depth, such as the
first 5 documents. As system continues seeking for more documents, a relatively
high advanced probability contributes higher effectiveness. In brief, this advanced
probability should be configured at a moderate value, given the length of the rank.
If the rank is not long, a high advanced probability is not cost-effective.
Figure D.6: RWBP values for weight1.
Then, we design rank2 that relevant documents appear late. In this case, R
= 7, d = 14, and the weight for each relevant one remain the same.
Ranking2: —–♣♣♣-♣-♣♣♣ (♣ represents relevant document)
115
Weight2 of each: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0, 0.2, 0, 0.4, 0.8, 0.7]
The calculation of N remains the same. Simulation results for total utilities
U are shown in Fig. D.7.
Figure D.7: Total utilities for weight2.
The total utilities start to grow once the relevant document is detected. Same
as case in rank1, as d increases, the total utilities start to grow along with the de-
tection of relevant documents. The final U for each probability is U1 =0.00020233,
U2 =0.0126, U3 =0.3709 and U4 =1.7923, respectively. Compared with the U in
rank1, they are lower. It shows that the distribution of relevant documents can affect
total utilities, i.e. the later the relevant documents appear, the lower total utilities
will be. Therefore, to increase the efficiency of data retrieval by increasing total
utilities, the relevant documents should appear at earlier positions in the rank.
Simulation result for RWBP given rank2 is as Fig. D.8. The RWBP for
each probability is RWBP1 = 0.00015175, RWBP2 =0.0063, RWBP3 =0.0891 and
RWBP4 =0.5242, respectively.
Generally speaking, compared with the RWBPs in rank1, they are lower. This
is because N remains the same, but the total utilities decrease. As the relevant
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Figure D.8: RWBP values for weight2.
documents appear late, the RWBP that captures the rate at which relevant documents
are found slows down. Note that the interpretation of precision scores needs to be
tempered by knowledge of R, the number of relevant documents. Similar as case of
rank1, RWBP in the most-persistent system (p=0.95) has not started to lead the
value until d is larger than 12. Since a persistent system (p = 0.95) is guaranteed
to obtain a low expected utility from a search with only a few relevant documents.
Non-persistent system will also obtain low RWBP scores if none of the initial few
documents are relevant. Different from the case in rank1, RWBP for non-persistent
system (for p is less than 0.5) is lower than the one in persistent system, from the
moment when the first relevant document is detected.
Finally, we change the rank and weight as below, and name it as rank3. It
represents the case that the relevant documents appear early. In this case, R = 7, d
= 14, and the weight for each relevant one remains the same.
Ranking3: ♣♣♣♣—-♣♣-♣– (♣ represents relevant document)
Weight3 of each: [0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.4, 0.8, 0, 0.7, 0, 0]
N is the same as rank1 and rank2. Simulation result for total utilities U is
in Fig. D.9. The U for each probability is U1 = 0.2094, U2 = 0.4035, U3 = 0.9970
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and U4 = 2.1755, respectively. Compared with RWBPs in rank1, they are higher. It
justifies the analysis for the vice-versa case that the relevant documents appear late.
Figure D.9: Total Utilities for weight3.
Simulation result for RWBP in weight 3 is as Fig. D.10.
Figure D.10: RWBP values for weight3.
Compared with RWBP in rank1 and rank1, the difference is distinct. Gener-
ally speaking, the value of RWBPs in this case are much higher, and the non-persistent
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system has the highest effectiveness. For persistent system, even the advance proba-
bility p = 0.8 is slightly higher than p = 0.95, the RWBP for the previous probability
is more than twice of the RWBP for the latter. The simulation result reveals that,
for a rank that relevant documents appear early, the system can just select the initial
relevant documents and then gain relatively high effectiveness.
As relevant documents appear less frequently in later positions, the total util-
ities slow down to increase, and the amount of increased RWBP decreases. For
non-persistent system, RWBP reaches to stable value since d = 4, whereas the per-
sistent system has potential to drastically improve RWBP even after d = 8. RWBP
for p = 0.8 surpasses the one for p = 0.5 after d = 8.
D.4.2 Simulation Results for Conditional Search. We add the con-
ditional probability of advancement, subjected to whether the previous examined
document is relevant. If the previous document is relevant, the probability to pro-
ceed to next one is p1 and we assume it as p1 = 0.4; if not relevant, the advanced
probability is p2 and we assume it as p2 = 0.9. In comparison, for the unconditional
search, we assume p = 0.5.
Given weight1, we can simulate the number of searched documents for at each




푖 ⋅ 푝푖−1 ⋅ (1− 푝) (D.4)
The simulation result for N is as Fig. D.11.
For the unconditional case, the finalized number of examined documents is
higher, whereas number of examined documents in the conditional case grows steadily.
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Figure D.11: N for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight1.
It indicates that, even the conditional probability is higher when the previous docu-
ment is irrelevant, the persistent system without condition (p = 0.5) still has searched
more documents on average.
Simulation result for U according to Equation D.2 is as Fig. D.12.
Figure D.12: U for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight1.
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For the unconditional case, the total utility is higher than the one in conditional
case. Again, on average, the system that searches documents without constraints on
the previous document still gain higher total utilities.
Simulation result for RWBP according to Equation D.3 is as Fig. D.13.
Figure D.13: RWBP for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight1.
RWBP of unconditional search is much more steadily-growing and higher than
that in conditional search. RWBP is changing dramatically according to the positions
of relevant documents. This is mainly because, the average number of examined
documents N are quite different given the previous document is relevant or not. If the
previous document is relevant, then N is 1/(1-p1) = 1.67, whereas if it is not relevant,
N = 10. Because of Equation D.3, RWBP has much greater transition whenever the
previous document is not relevant. The result proves that a high advanced probability
indeed can improve the data retrieval effectiveness given the previous document is not
relevant. The weight of each document does not provide much contribution in the
discussion here.
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Secondly, we investigate the case in rank2. Given weight2, the simulation result
for N at each d is as Fig. D.14.
Figure D.14: N for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight2.
Similar to rank1, the average number of examined documents is lower in the
conditional case than in the unconditional case. As the relevant documents appear
late, N changes late in conditional case, whereas the change of N becomes minor and
steady in unconditional case.
Simulation result for U is as Fig. D.15. Total utilizes start to increase in
both cases after relevant documents have been detected. However, the total utility
in unconditional case is 6 times higher than the one in conditional case, whereas in
rank1, the difference is smaller than double times. And U in rank2 is much smaller
than the one in rank1, particularly, U for unconditional case in rank1 is 10 times
larger than the one in rank2. It shows that, even in the same weights, if the relevant
documents appear late, the total utilities can be greatly affected.
Simulation result for RWBP is as Fig. D.16.
Similar to the situation in rank1, the effectiveness in unconditional case is
steadily increasing, while the one in conditional case varies subjected to the position
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Figure D.15: U for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight2.
Figure D.16: RWBP for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight2.
of irrelevant documents. Compared with the values of RWBP in rank1, the one in
rank2 is much smaller, specifically, the RWBP in rank1 is about 1000 times of the
one in rank2. This again shows that the effectiveness of data retrieval can greatly
deteriorate in the rank where relevant documents appear late.
Finally, we investigate the case in rank3. Subjected to weight3, the simulation
result for N is as Fig. D.17.
As the relevant documents appear early, N is higher in conditional case than
the one in the unconditional case, but the value in unconditional case still grows more
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Figure D.17: N for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight3.
steadily. The average number of searched documents in rank3 are higher than both
the ones in rank1 and rank2.
Simulation result for U is as Fig. D.18.
The values of total utilities in conditional case are still lower than the one in
unconditional case. But in rank3, both of them grow steadily and are much higher
the corresponding values in rank1 and rank2.
Simulation result for RWBP is as Fig. D.19.
In rank3, as the relevant documents appear early, RWBP in both cases starts
to grow at the beginning. This is due to the fact that the U grows more faster
than N grows at first 4 relevant documents. RWBP in unconditional case reaches to
stable value around 0.2 after d = 4, whereas RWBP in conditional case drops sharply
when irrelevant documents appear. In rank3, the amount of variation in RWBP is
the largest one among the three ranks, and the highest value can be almost 40 times
larger than the lowest one. The effectiveness in rank3 is better than rank1 and rank2,
in both conditional and unconditional cases.
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Figure D.18: U for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight3.
Figure D.19: RWBP for conditional vs. unconditional search in weight3.
In summary, the performance of unconditional case is better than the one of
conditional case, measured by total utilities and effectiveness. The simulation results
build the basis for system configuration to carry on the search task. When the system
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is configured to seek for the relevant mitigation technique, it is more cost-effective to
configure the advanced probability to be unconditional in general.
D.4.3 Minimum Depth of Query. We can calculate the minimum depth
of query (d) based on the requirement of precision.
A useful consequence of the proposed RWBP metric is that it is possible
to compute upper and lower bounds on effectiveness, even when the knowledge of
ranking and relevance judgments is partial rather than comprehensive in a large
system. With the help of RWBP, it is straightforward to accumulate an uncertainty
value that captures the unknown component of the effectiveness metric.
The simplest case is when the ranking is calculated to a depth of d answers
per query, and the contributions from depth d + 1 on are not available. Then the





푝푖−1 = (1− 푝) ⋅ 푝푑 ⋅
∞∑
푖=1
푝푖−1 = 푝푑 (D.5)
The calculation of uncertainty value can be done in advance of any experimen-
tation. For example, with p = 0.25 and a pooling depth of d = 15, the uncertainty
value from all remaining terms in the geometric series is 0.2515 = 9.3132×109, which
implies the precision that calculated RWBP should be quoted to 10 decimal digits.
Conversely, when four decimal digits of accuracy are required, i.e. the residual should
be less than 0.001, and the required depth to attain this is a function of the value of
p used as Equation D.6:
푝푑 < 0.001 (D.6)




When p = 0.5, p = 0.8, and p = 0.95, this expression suggests minimum
evaluation depth of d = 10, d = 31, and d = 135, respectively. By extending the
depth d of the ranking, we can increase the amount of information taken into account,
which enhance precision in the estimations of effectiveness values.
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